LEFT AND RIGHT

BLACK REVOLUTION

MIDDLE EAST WAR

VIETNAM

A JOURNAL OF LIBERTARIAN THOUGHT

AUTUMN 1967 NO. 3 85¢

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LEFT AND RIGHT

A Journal Of Libertarian Thought

Editors: MURRAY N. ROTHBARD
LEONARD P. LIGGIO
H. GEORGE RESCH

CONTENTS Autumn 1967 Vol. III, No. 3

EDITORIALS

Ernesto Che Guevara, RIP 3

The Black Revolution 7

On Desecrating the Flag 18

War Guilt in the Middle East 20

RONALD RADOSH,
America's Entry into World War II 31

LAURENCE S. MOSS,
The Power Elite Revisited 39

MARVIN E. GETTLEMAN,
A Vietnam Bibliography 45

A BERNARD FALL RETROSPECTIVE 60

LEONARD P. LIGGIO, On Fall's Viet-Nam Witness 68

MARVIN E. GETTLEMAN, On Fall's
Hell in a Very Small Place 70

Left and Right **is published three times yearly (Winter, Spring, Autumn) by Left and Right, Inc., Box 395, Cathedral Station, New York, New York 10025. Subscription price: $2.50. Single issues: 85c.**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NEW
INDIVIDUALIST
REVIEW

Interested in the Anti-Conservative Right?

Interested in Libertarian Ideas?

NEW INDIVIDUALIST REVIEW was founded in 1961 with the intent of voicing a consistent and informed libertarian position —civil liberties, limited government, and freedom of contract and property—without contaminating the cause of liberty with anti-Communism and the American Empire.

IF YOU ARE INTERESTED in the ideas and evidence supporting a voluntary society; if you have discovered the intellectual bankruptcy of the authoritarian, statist position (Leftist and Rightist) then you should subscribe to **NEW INDIVIDUALIST REVIEW**, a journal of Classical Liberal thought, published quarterly. Subscription rates are $3.00 per year; students, $1.50.

WRITE: **NEW INDIVIDUALIST REVIEW**
Ida Noyes Hall
University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois 60637

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ERNESTO CHE GUEVARA, R.I.P.

Che is dead, and we all mourn him. Why? How is it that so many libertarians mourn this man; how is it that we just received a letter from a brilliant young libertarian, a former objectivist and Birchite, which said, in part: "if they did finally get Che . . . I am sure that his memory will live to haunt both Latin America and the U. S. for decades to come. Long live Che!" How come? Surely not because Che was a Communist. Precious few people in this country or anywhere else will mourn the passing, for example, of Brezhnev, Kosygin, or Ulbricht, Communist leaders all. No, it is certainly not Che's Communist goals which made his name a byword and a legend throughout the world, and throughout the New Left in this country.

What made Che such an heroic figure for our time is that he, more than any man of our epoch or even of our century, was the living embodiment of the principle of Revolution. More than any man since the lovable but entirely ineffectual nineteenth-century Russian anarchist, Mikhail Bakunin, Che earned the title of "professional revolutionary." And furthermore, to paraphrase Christopher Jencks in a recent perceptive, if wrongheaded, article in the New Republic, we all knew that his enemy was our enemy--that great Colossus that oppresses and threatens all the peoples of the world, U. S. imperialism.

Trained as a physician in Argentina, witnessing CIA-fomented counter-revolution by the thug Castillo Armas in Guatemala, Guevara dedicated the rest of his life to the Revolution. He found a promising field first in Cuba,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

where, as everyone knows, Che was second only to Fidel Castro in waging and then winning the revolution there.

Che was a notable revolutionary, but not a distinguished administrator, and even poorer as an economist. It was Che who led the policy of coercively shifting Cuba from specialization in sugar toward a greater self-sufficiency--an arbitrary and uneconomic gesture that almost wrecked the Cuban economy until Fidel, spurred by the economic realists in Russia, called a halt and reversed the trend. Frustrated as an administrator, realizing that such work was not his forte, Che left Cuba to follow his chosen career of revolutionary, to ignite and spur revolutionary combat throughout Latin America. But before he did so, Che distilled his own experiences to become a distinguished theorist of revolutionary warfare, his book of Guerrilla Warfare coming to rank with the writings of Mao and General Giap in this new and burgeoning discipline.

Che's disappearance for years ignited and accelerated the living legend that grew about him. It was a great and romantic legend, but it would all too quickly grow to destroy him. For as the cause of the Revolution began to become increasingly wrapped around the person of Che, Guevara began to forget his own vital principle that the revolution must grow out of the indigenous consciousness and struggles of the local peasantry. In his head Che knew full well that he and a handful of Cubans, no matter how carefully trained, could never export revolution, could never impose revolution upon a Bolivian or a Venezuelan peasantry who were not ready for the struggle. But in his mighty heart Che could not refrain from leaping a whole raft of stages, from plunging romantically but recklessly into the premature adventure of armed struggle in Latin America. And so, with tragic irony, Che Guevara, in his daring and courage, was betrayed by the very Bolivian peasantry whom he was trying to liberate, and who barely understood the meaning of the conflict. Che died from violating his own principles of revolutionary war.

There are other ironies in the death of Che Guevara. It was reported that as Che's martyred body was brought in triumph to Vallegrande, Bolivia, a Cuban emigre and CIA-agent rushed over, and, on the public streets, began to embalm the body. The ubiquituous CIA was there to claim its own.

The CIA might claim Che's body, but it will never be able to shackle his spirit. The most fitting memorial to Che was the intensely moving speech about his death de-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

livered by his old comrade-in-arms, Fidel Castro. In that speech, Fidel declared:

> No matter how difficult it may be to imagine that a man of his stature, of his prestige, of his personality, could have died in a clash between a guerrilla patrol and an army force, no matter how illogical it may seem, we who know him well realize, however, that it is not at all strange. Because he was always, during the whole time that we knew him, characterized by an extraordinary daring, by an absolute scorn of death, by his way, in every difficult and dangerous moment, of doing the most difficult and dangerous things. He did this many times during our struggle....
>
> We were always worried lest his temperament, his habit of always being present during the moments of danger, should lead him to his death in combat.
>
> No one could ever be sure that he would take even the slightest precautions. Many times he went forward with the advance patrols....
>
> Above all else we would have liked to have seen him as the builder of the great victories of the people rather than as the precursor of those victories. But the fact is that a man of that temperament, of that personality, of that character, of that way of reacting before certain circumstances, is unfortunately usually destined to be the precursor rather than the one who realizes the victories. And the precursors are also, of course, the builders of victory, the greatest builders of victory....
>
> It should not surprise anyone that he was among the first to fall in a guerrilla combat, since it would have been almost a miracle, almost impossible for it to have been otherwise....
>
> The imperialists' cries of victory in which they say that this will discourage revolutionary struggle will be shortly disproven by actual events. The imperialists also know the power, the impact of an example, and they also know that even though a man can be physically eliminated, an example like that can never be eliminated by anything or anyone....
>
> Newspapers of all tendencies have universally recognized Che's virtues.... He is an almost unique example of how a man could win the recognition and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

respect of his enemies, of the very enemies he faced with his arms in his hands, of those who have been ideological enemies and have nevertheless expressed feelings of admiration and of respect toward Che....

Has the history of revolutions or of revolutionary peoples been characterized perhaps by the absence of hard blows? Aren't true revolutionaries the ones who rise above those blows, those setbacks, and are not discouraged? Aren't we revolutionaries precisely the ones who proclaim the value of moral principles, the value of example? Aren't we revolutionaries the ones who believe in the durability of man's works, of man's principles? Aren't we revolutionaries the first to recognize how ephemeral the physical life of man is and how durable and lasting man's ideas, conduct and example are, when it has been man's example that has guided the people throughout history? [1]

"Fidel Confirms Death of Che", National Guardian October 21, 1967), p. 5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The BLACK Revolution

Bewildered white Liberals are wont to ask: "What do you people want?"Some newsmen recently asked virtually this same question of H. Rap Brown, fiery young leader of SNCC and the Black Power movement. Rap replied: "I want Lyndon Johnson to resign and go to Vietnam and fight--he and his family." Particularly interesting were the varied reactions to this statement; the reporter adds that: "Negro onlookers cheered as he brushed aside newsmen's requests that he be 'more specific.'" Indeed: how specific can one get? Why didn't "Whitey" get the message?

The message, then, the great new fact about the Negro movement in America is that, in the last two years, it has changed drastically its methods and its goals. Until recently, it was a "civil rights movement", led by Liberals and Social Democrats of the NAACP, dedicated to coercing whites into "integrating" all manner of private and public facilities. In short, its goal and its means were statist and Liberal to the core.

Now that this integration has been "achieved", what do they want? But, in the first place, integration has not been achieved at all. In the most blatantly segregated areas, a pathetic "tokenism" has replaced segregation, but in the crucial areas of jobs, housing, power, the country remains the same as it ever was. It is becoming increasingly clear that, as the Conservatives said all along, integration cannot be achieved by law and by coercion; it must first come willingly into the hearts of men. All right, so then what? Negroes began

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to see that, not only was integration impossible of achievement, but that the very goal itself is flawed at its root. For what joy, what dignity, what satisfaction is there in forcing someone to eat or work or live with you if he despises you? Who, then, wants to integrate with him?

The Negroes then, began to turn, and turn swiftly, from the old Liberal ideal of compulsory integration to another tradition that had previously lingered, underground and un-respectable, at the core of the Negro community. This was the idea of black nationalism, an idea that had always appealed, not to the educated and articulate Negroes, but to the poorest inhabitants of the ghetto. The black nationalist idea came to the fore in the 1920's with the phenomenally popular Marcus Garvey, who preached a return to Africa. With the death of Garvey, the idea dropped underground again, to re-emerge in the 1950's with the phenomenon of the Black Muslims and its great charismatic leader, Malcolm X.

For a time many conservatives were enthusiastic about black nationalism; forgetting about the ultimate goal of either return to Africa or several Negro states in the U. S., the conservatives were overjoyed with the nationalist and Muslim emphasis on Negro self-help, thrift, dignity, and pride, in contrast to the old ideals of coerced integration from above. But there is one thing that the conservative proponents of black nationalism overlooked: self-help, pride, thrift, Negro businesses, etc. are all well and fine. But they cannot hope to flourish within the context of the black reality in America: permanent oppression by the white "power structure." None of these good and libertarian things can be achieved without, first and foremost, getting the white-run U. S. and local and state governments off the backs of the Negro people.

Thus, the libertarian-conservatives made the same fatal mistake here as in their broader viewpoint on the free market and the free society. Libertarian-conservatives preach the virtues of the free market and individual liberty--without for a moment acknowledging that these great and good things can only be achieved by liquidating the tyranny of the government of the United States, and all other governments throughout the world. In short, these libertarian-conservatives have totally forgotten what the quasi-libertarians of the early nineteenth century: the James Mills, the Benthams, the Cobdens and Brights, to say nothing of the William Lloyd Garrisons and John Browns, full knew: that liberty is a profoundly revolutionary concept, and that it can only be achieved through the liquidation of the oppressor State.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Similarly, the black nationalists came to realize what the libertarian-conservatives forgot: that to achieve Negro freedom and autonomy white rule over Negroes must be brought to an end. Hence, the radicalizing and revolutionizing of Malcolm X, and then, after his martyrdom, of SNCC and CORE. Hence the shift of concepts in the Negro movement from "civil rights" to "black liberation." Hence, also the focussing of black rebellion against the living embodiments of white rule in the black "ghettoes": specifically, and first and foremost, the police. It is the overwhelmingly white police who are the enforcers of racial law and who express the basic racism of their own community by systematic brutalizing of the subject population. It is true, of course, that police are systematically brutal anyway: for the police (a) have a legal monopoly of the guns, and he who is entrusted with such great power will be the one who enjoys using that power to the hilt; and (b) the police are the enforcement arm for all the despotic legislation and ordinances on the government books. The police are the hired thugs who do the dirty work for the bosses of the State apparatus. In confronting poor people, the police are far rougher than with the upper or middle class, because of the lack of social or political power among the poor. But in confronting Negroes, the racist attitude of the polizei reinforces and redoubles their usual brutal role.

It is no accident that virtually every single case of black rebellion in the cities in the summer of '67 was precipitated by police brutality: by beating up a Negro cab driver in Newark, by raiding and beating up an after-hours drinking club in Detroit. It is also no accident that, despite all the press hysteria about sniping and looting, the greatest bulk of the crime committed during the riots was by the enforcement-thugs of the State: the police, the National Guard, the federal troops. Almost all the killings were of Negroes by the police and troops; in fact, the behaviour of these enforcers was clearly reminiscent of the behaviour of U. S. imperial troops in Vietnam, or, in fact, of military occupiers anywhere in their continuing, permanent war against the native colored population. Thus, if a sniper fired from a building, the characteristic response of our police-Guard-army "protectors" was to spray fire into the entire building, heedless of the destruction and the casualties that would have to follow. One of the great lessons of the summer rebellions which we all should absorb is that the black population of the United States is a colonized and subject people.

Thus, newsmen reported that, on the staff of New Jersey Governor Hughes during the Newark and Plainfield

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rebellions, there were the "hawks" and the "doves" Terms like "hold and clear", "search and destroy", began to be applicable. Also revealing was the famous interview (New York Times, July 29) with Maj. Gen. Almerin C. O'Hara, commander of the New York State Army National Guard. General O'Hara called for "greater commitment of force" to bring the riots under control, and added the amazing statement that he would "not rule out the use of any weapon." Escalation once again raises its ugly head; will someone soon suggest the use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons on American cities--"clean" ones, of course, so that the fallout does not filter down to white areas? The general, however, assures us that while he contemplates the use of hand grenades, bazookas, and recoilless rifles, the chances of using heavy artillery are "very remote". Well, let us be grateful for small blessings.

General O'Hara insisted that National Guard actions must be under the authority and decisions of the military, including the choice of tactics and weapons, since "civilians are not cognizant" of the delicate fine points. "There are military decisions which should be left to military men." O'Hara also stressed that the National Guard must not be "unduly restrained by civilian authority", because "if the military is brought in and they lose control, then what do you have left?" The answer, it seems, is no control at all, in short, freedom, which is, of course, unthinkable in our "freedom-loving" country.

General O'Hara conceded that the standard riot control techniques--stressing closed formations with bayonets at the ready--are "not really adequate for the kind of guerrilla warfare (this is American cities he's talking about, not Vietnam!!) and snipers we face these days." Instead, he said, "military methods used in flushing guerrillas out of a village in Vietnam could be adapted to guerrilla warfare in the ghettoes." "Of course," the general added wistfully, "we can't do just what we would do in Vietnam. Out there if you had a sniper in a room you'd just crank up a tank and fire a shell through the window, destroying the whole room, and much of the building. I don't think public opinion would accept the use of that kind of force here."

Let us also ponder this: if a white neighborhood were rioting and looting, would buildings be pulverized en masse? Would curfews be imposed, and streets blockaded? Would apartment-to-apartment searches be made, as at Plainfield, New Jersey, breaking down doors and destroying furniture without bothering about search warrants? Of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thousands wounded during the virtual civil war of July, 1967, almost all were Negro, and the vast majority were shot by trigger-happy white troops and police, concerned only to "shoot everything that is black and that moves", in the perceptive words of one officer.

Was there need to stop looting? Looting is certainly unjustifiable, but by what right does the State move in and shoot looters? Shooting amounts to capital punishment, and by any moral standards, death as a punishment for looting is so excessive and barbaric a punishment that it amounts to criminal murder of the looter-victim. A criminal only forfeits the rights which he takes away from another person; and therefore capital punishment for any crime less than murder is itself a criminal murder.

The grisly masterpiece of unconscious humor during the July Days was emitted by President Johnson, who had the unmitigated gall to proclaim, on July 24: "We will not endure violence. It matters not by whom it is done, or under what slogan or banner. It will not be tolerated." Surely this statement is a classic of its kind. It comes from a man in charge of the greatest violence-wielding machine, the mightiest collection of destructive power, in the history of the world. It comes from a man who is ordering, every day, the use of that power to bomb, burn, and napalm thousands of innocent women and children and old people in Vietnam. Yet so "brainwashed" is the American people, so used are they to the irrationalities of our society, that the statement was taken with a straight face by the public, none of whom seemed to include, under "what slogan or banner", the "saving" of the crushed and bleeding people of Vietnam, North and South, from the clutches of "international Communism."

And so while LBJ denounces violence no matter the slogan or banner, H. Rap Brown declares his goal to be the resigning of Johnson and going with his family to fight personally in Vietnam. Which statement was the more rational: the blatant self-contradiction of Johnson's or the perceptive, libertarian revolutionary statement of the supposedly "irrational" H. Rap Brown? And there is another set of statements that the two made that could also be set side by side to compare the devotion to truth, reason, and justice of the two men. Johnson, in his statement, proclaimed: "From its earliest day, our nation has been dedicated to justice, to equality--and to order." About justice and equality there is grave room for doubt; but not about our government's continuing devotion to "order". But what order? And whose order? The order of the exploiter, of the monopolist, of the imperialist, of the con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

troller and ruler of the State apparatus. Let Rap Brown tell it: "The white man makes all the laws, he drags us before his courts, he accuses us, and he sits in judgment over us."

While the polizei are the most blatant and evident example of race rule and hence the greatest focus of black resentment, there are other crucial groups in the ghetto who also serve as despotic "colonial administrators" over the Negro people. One group is the urban renewal planners. All good Liberals, not so long ago, used to admire urban renewal as a means of helping the poor and bringing esthetics to the city. Now, radicals and some conservatives are beginning to agree (in another burgeoning form of "Left-Right" coalition) that urban renewal is really a vast subsidy to the real estate interests at the expense, not only of the taxpayer which was always evident, but also of the poor themselves, who are summarily kicked out of their homes by the urban renewal bulldozer, and forced elsewhere, redoubling the slums there. If they try to move into the new urban renewal housing, they find that there is far less space available, and at much higher rents than they were paying before. And so, more and more people are coming to recognize, "urban renewal" is really "Negro removal"--for urban renewal has been concentrated in the Negro ghetto areas. It is surely significant that one of the great Negro grievances underlying this summer's riot was the plan of the Newark government to liquidate many thousands of Negro homes in the center of the Negro district of the city in order to make way for another campus of the New Jersey State's College of Medicine and Dentistry.

In addition to urban renewal, another large group of colonial administrators dictating to and oppressing the Negro are the administrators and teachers of the nation's urban public schools. The public-school system, again so beloved by middle-class Liberals and again overwhelmingly staffed by whites, is a vast prison-house and chain-gang for the nation's youth. The compulsory attendance laws force all of the youth of the country, regardless of their talents or inclinations, into this vast prison-system, and the teachers and administrators are their guards and wardens. The oppression lies much the heaviest in the urban Negro areas, where so many children are not inclined toward schooling and where racism as well as hatred for working-class mores are given full rein by the school staff, armed with the power of compulsory education to force their charges to stay in school. No wonder that Negro youth are embittered by their enforced stay in the system! Jonathan Kozol has just written

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a book about his harrowing experiences in the Boston school system, where Negro youth were systematically beaten physically and degraded and humiliated psychologically by their white guardians. On a more philosophical level, Paul Goodman and Edgar Z. Friedenberg have, in recent years, focussed more of our attention on the evils of compulsory mass public schooling and the consequences for the children that have flowed from it.

Police, troops--and of course, white judges in the courts--and teachers and school administrators; these are some of the colonial administrators over the Negro population. Another large and important group are the welfare workers, again mostly white, who administer the welfare programs in the ghetto. Not only are these workers engaged in setting up unmanly dependence among the Negro "clients" and are resented therefore, they also organize Gestapo-type raids on their clients in the middle of the night--without a search warrant, by the way--to make sure that there are no men in or under the female client's bed, who could serve her as a private means of support.

And so the Negro ghettoes are enmeshed in a network of white-run and white-operated despotic colonial agencies. Hence the black revolution. Hence the cry for black power. It is a call for black power in black areas, it is a call for allowing the Negro people at last to run their own lives as they see fit. It is a call for an end to white race rule over the Negro.

A common Liberal objection is that the black revolution cannot hope to win as such because the Negroes are in a minority in the U. S. They are, however, a very large and therefore potentially powerful minority. But more than that, the Negro aim is not to overthrow the U. S. or local governments totally; if that were the aim, then of course the black liberation movement in the U. S. would be hopelessly quixotic. No, the aim is to overthrow white U. S. and local government rule <u>in black areas</u>--in those areas where blacks are a majority; roughly, the Black Belt of the South, and the ghetto areas of the North and West. This would be, in effect, a disintegration of white U. S. rule over these territories. And this is a perfectly feasible objective.

There is another consideration that gives weight to the realistic potential of the black power movement. That is, if the Negroes consider themselves the American cutting edge of the international struggle against the imperialism of the U. S. government. For just as the Negroes within the U. S. are battling white colonialism at home; so is the great majority of the world's population--largely colored peoples

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the underdeveloped world--battling U. S. imperialism abroad. Considering the world as a whole, the colored anti-imperialists are a great majority while U. S. whites are quite clearly a minority. Hence the great achievement of SNCC and CORE in recent years; from being ordinary American patriots unconcerned with foreign affairs, they have become anti-imperialists consciously linking themselves with their colored anti-imperialist brethren abroad. This notable advance is symbolized by Stokely Carmichael's extended stay in the anti-imperialist world. And here once again, the martyred Malcolm X was the pioneer; it was when he had begun to internationalize the Negro struggle that he was cut down by assassins.

Finally, the seemingly far-fetched solution of black nationalism in black areas bids fair to be the only solution to the Negro question that will work. The two alternative solutions: the Liberal and the Conservative--are conspicuously failing to work and will continue to fail. The Conservative therapy for riots is, of course, simply the application of ever-greater force, just as this is the Conservative remedy for practically everything, from pornography to Vietnam. Send more troops, send more tanks, bomb 'em, defoliate 'em!! Etc. But in the Negro rebellions, it was demonstrated that more National Guards, more counter-revolutionary force applied by the State, simply provoked more rebel force, more sniping, etc. It was only, in many cases, when the Guardsmen and the troops were pulled out of the ghetto that calm was restored. Besides, when is the escalation of force demanded by the Conservatives going to stop? With the clean H-bomb? It very much appears that U. S. force will not be able to "win" until the entire Negro population is wiped out, just as U. S. force won't be able to win in Vietnam without the genocidal destruction of the entire Vietnamese population. Is that what the Conservatives want, and is that what they call "victory"?

The Liberal solution has been shown to be little better. The Liberal solution, both at home and abroad, is of course always the same: more Federal money. If it's the American ghettoes then more Federal funds, more Federal subsidies, loans, playgrounds, etc., etc. And if it's Vietnam, then more foreign aid, more "welfare planning", etc. Again, both solutions have failed dismally. Detroit, everyone agrees, was supposed to be the great model home of Liberal Race Relations, with plenty of playgrounds, Human Relations Committees and all the rest. And Detroit suffered a week-long civil war with property damage of $1 billion. As the always scintillating reporter Andrew Kopkind wrote in the New York

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Review of Books about the rebellion, Detroit murdered Liberalism. And good riddance. It is no wonder that Liberal solutions cannot succeed; for the Federal funds tactic simply increases the governmental bureaucracy, aggravates the Negro dependence and resentment which inspired the rebellions in the first place. But Liberals, whose entire philosophy is steeped in the coercive creation of dependence, could never understand this truth; if they did, their whole credo would fall to the ground. Only the "extreme Left" and the "extreme Right" can understand.

Increasingly, there are two kinds of "Left-Right" coalitions emerging on the American scene and in American social philosophy. There is the ugly and despotic coalitionism of the "Left Center" and "Right Center", of both the Liberal and Conservative wings of the Establishment. This is the kind of coalitionism that occurs when the current Right lauds the 100% ADA-Liberal Senator Thomas Dodd or when the ADA-Liberal Daniel Moynihan calls for an explicit coalition with National Review-type Conservatism over the two great issues of our day: Vietnam, and the black revolution. There is indeed full scope for coalition here. For, in the final analysis, the social philosophies of Liberalism and Conservatism are as alike as Tweedledum and Tweedledee. Their emphasis and their rhetoric is different; their substance is much the same, and grows closer day by day. For on what can Federal force rest but Federal funds? And how can Federal funds be collected and dispensed without the use of Federal force? In short, money and coercion, emphasized by Liberals and Conservatives respectively, in reality go hand in hand. And that is why the carrot-and-stick approach toward the Negro ghettoes, toward Vietnam, and, in truth, toward virtually everything else, can be supported enthusiastically by Liberals and Conservatives alike.

The other coalition looming is the coalition of opposition, the opposition of all those who, whatever their differences of rhetoric, emphasis, or even substance, join in their implacable hostility to the force-and-funds, the coercion wrapped in Liberal rhetoric, the "humanitarian-with-the-guillotine" in the memorable phrase of the libertarian Isabel Paterson, of the U. S. Liberal-Conservative Establishment. The most important call for such a coalition has come in the recent work of the thoughtful and eloquent Carl Oglesby, last year's president of the Students for a Democratic Society:

> "The right wing in America is presently in a state of almost eerie spiritual disarray....the conservative right

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wing of imperialist, authoritarian, and even monarchist disposition enjoys the fraternity of the libertarian right wing of laissez faire, free market individualism. These two groupings could not possibly have less in common. Why have the libertarians conceded leadership to the conservatives? Why have the traditional opponents of big, militarized, central authoritarian government now joined forces with such a government's boldest advocates?

They have done so because they have been persuaded that there is a clear and present danger that necessitates a temporary excursion from final values. They should know better. They should know that for the totalitarian imperialists there is always a clear and present danger, that it is pre-eminently through the ideology of the Foreign Threat, the myth of the tiger at the gates, that frontier and global imperialism have always rationalized themselves....

It would be a piece of great good fortune for America and the world if the libertarian right could be reminded that besides the debased Republicanism of the Knowlands and the Judds there is another tradition available to them--their own: the tradition of Congressman Howard Buffett, Senator Taft's midwestern campaign manager in 1952....of Frank Chodorov...of Dean Russell....of the tough-minded Garet Garrett....

This style of political thought, rootedly American, is carried forward today by the Negro freedom movement and the student movement against Great Society-Free World Imperialism. That these movements are called leftist means nothing. They are of the grain of American humanist individualism and voluntaristic associational action; and it is only through them that the libertarian tradition is activated and kept alive. In a strong sense, the Old Right and the New Left are morally and politically coordinate." [1]

Professor Staughton Lynd, among other Left critics of Oglesby's call for a libertarian Left-Right coalition, protests in Liberation that the positive economic programs of the two wings are completely different, despite their common opposition to racism and war, and their common stand for decentralization and grass-roots decision making. The one believes in communal decisions, the

---

1. Carl Oglesby, "Vietnamese Crucible", in Carl Oglesby and Richard Shaull, Containment and Change (New York; Macmillan, 1967), pp. 165-167.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other in individualism and private property. True enough; but even if we should ever get to the post-victory stage when this potential divergence should become imminent, Lynd does not realize that there is nothing in the individualist libertarian philosophy that would deny to Lynd or anyone else the option of forming their own voluntary communalist societies. That freedom of action is precisely one of the doctrines championed by the individualist believers in the free market and the free society.

SUBSCRIBE!!!

NAME .....

STREET OR BOX .....

CITY & STATE .....

Mail to

Left and Right, Inc.
Box 395, Cathedral Station
New York, N. Y. 10025

$2.50 for one year

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EDITORIAL

ON DESECRATING THE FLAG

The Congress of the United States, in its wisdom, has now moved to make a federal offense out of "desecrating the flag". No doubt the great bulk of those who fought for, and voted for, this law, believe themselves to be devoted Christians and champions of the rights of private property. We shall prove that they are nothing of the kind.

The first thing that should be clear about the flag is that it is simply a piece of cloth with parallel stripes of certain colors. So the first thing that we should ask ourselves is: what is there about a piece of cloth that suddenly renders it sacred, holy, and above defilement when red and white stripes are woven into it? Contrary to many of our hysterical politicians, the flag is not our country; still less is the flag the freedom of the individual. The flag is simply a piece of cloth. Period. Therefore he who tampers with or "desecrates" that piece of cloth is not posing any kind of a threat to our freedoms or our way of life.

Consider the implications of taking the contrary position: if the flag is not just a piece of cloth, then this means that some form of mystical transsubstantiation must take place, and therefore that weaving a piece of cloth in a certain manner suddenly invests it with great and awesome sanctity. Indeed Webster's defines "desecrate": as "to divest of a sacred character or office". Most people who revere and worship the flag in this way are religious; but to apply to a secular object this kind of adoration is nothing more nor less than idolatry. Religious people should be always on their guard against the worship of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

graven images; but their worship of State flags is nothing less than that kind of idolatry.

If, indeed, the flag is a symbol of anything throughout history, it has been the battle standard of the thugs of the State apparatus, the banner that the State raises when it goes into battle to kill, burn, and maim innocent people of some other land. All flags are soaked in innocent blood, and to revere these particular kinds of cloth, then, becomes not only idolatry but grotesque idolatry at that, for it is the worship of crime and murder on a massive scale.

There is another critical point in this whole controversy that nobody, least of all the defenders of anti-desecration laws, seems to have mentioned. When someone buys flag cloth, this cloth is his private property, to do with as he sees fit: to revere, to place in the closet... or to desecrate. How can anyone deny this who believes in the rights of private property? Anti-desecration laws and ordinances are clear-cut and outrageous invasions of the rights of private property, and on this ground alone they should be repealed forthwith.

Freedom must mean, among other things, the freedom to desecrate.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EDITORIAL

WAR GUILT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The trouble with sectarians, whether they be libertarians, Marxists, or world-governmentalists, is that they tend to rest content with the root cause of any problem, and never bother themselves with the more detailed or proximate causes. The best, and almost ludicrous, example of blind, unintelligent sectarianism is the Socialist Labor Party, a venerable party with no impact whatsoever on American life. To any problem that the state of the world might pose: unemployment, automation, Vietnam, nuclear testing, or whatever, the SLP simply repeats, parrotlike: "Adopt socialism." Since capitalism is allegedly the root cause of all these and other problems, only socialism will whisk them away, Period. In this way the sectarian, even if his spotting of the ultimate root cause should be correct, isolates himself from all problems of the real world, and, in further irony, keeps himself from having any impact toward the ultimate goal he cherishes.

On the question of war guilt, whatever the war, sectarianism raises its ugly, uninformed head far beyond the stagnant reaches of the Socialist Labor Party. Libertarians, Marxists, world-governmentalists, each from their different perspective, have a built-in tendency to avoid bothering about the detailed pros and cons of any given conflict. Each of them knows that the root cause of war is the nation-State system; given the existence of this system, wars will always occur, and all States will share in that guilt. The libertarian, in particular, knows that all States, without exception, aggress against their citizens, and knows also

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that in all wars each State aggresses against innocent civilians "belonging" to the other State.

Now this kind of insight into the root cause of war and aggression, and into the nature of the State itself, is all well and good, and vitally necessary for insight into the world condition. But the trouble is that the libertarian tends to stop there, and evading the responsibility of knowing what is going on in any specific war or international conflict, he tends to leap unjustifiably to the conclusion that, in any war, all States are equally guilty, and then to go about his business without giving the matter a second thought. In short, the libertarian (and the Marxist, and the world-government partisan) tends to dig himself into a comfortable "Third Camp" position, putting equal blame on all sides to any conflict, and letting it go at that. This is a comfortable position to take because it doesn't really alienate the partisans of either side. Both sides in any war will write this man off as a hopelessly "idealistic" and out-of-it sectarian, a man who is even rather lovable because he simply parrots his "pure" position without informing himself or taking sides on whatever war is raging in the world. In short, both sides will tolerate the sectarian precisely because he is irrelevant, and because his irrelevancy guarantees that he makes no impact on the course of events or on public opinion about these events.

No: Libertarians must come to realize that parroting ultimate principles is not enough for coping with the real world. Just because all sides share in the ultimate State-guilt, does not mean that all sides are equally guilty. On the contrary, in virtually every war, one side is far more guilty than the other, and on one side must be pinned the basic responsibility for aggression, for a drive for conquest, etc. But in order to find out which side to any war is the more guilty, we have to inform ourselves in depth about the history of that conflict, and that takes time and thought--and it also takes the ultimate willingness to become relevant by taking sides through pinning a greater degree of guilt on one side or the other.

So--let us become relevant; and, with that in mind, let us examine the root historical causes of the chronic as well as the current acute crisis in the Middle East; and let us do this with a view to discovering and assessing the Guilty.

The chronic Middle East crisis goes back--as do many crises--to World War I. The British, in return for mobilizing the Arab peoples against their oppressors of imperial

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Turkey, promised the Arabs their independence when the war was over. But, at the same time, the British government, with characteristic double-dealing, was promising Arab Palestine as a "National Home" for organized Zionism. These promises were not on the same moral plane: for in the former case, the Arabs were being promised their own land freed from Turkish domination; and in the latter, world Zionism was being promised a land most emphatically not its own. When World War I was over, the British unhesitatingly chose to keep the wrong promise, the one to world Zionism. Its choice was not difficult; if it had kept its promise to the Arabs, Great Britain would have had to pull gracefully out of the Middle East and turn that land over to its inhabitants; but, to fulfill its promise to Zionism, Britain had to remain as a conquering, imperial power ruling over Arab Palestine. That it chose the imperial course is hardly surprising.

We must, then, go back still further in history: for what was world Zionism? Before the French Revolution, the Jews of Europe had been largely encased in ghettoes, and there emerged from ghetto life a distinct Jewish cultural and ethnic (as well as religious) identity, with Yiddish as the common language (Hebrew being only the ancient language of religious ritual.) After the French Revolution, the Jews of Western Europe were emancipated from ghetto life, and they then faced a choice of where to go from there. One group, the heirs of the Enlightenment, chose and advocated the choice of casting off narrow, parochial ghetto culture on behalf of assimilation into the culture and the environment of the Western world. While assimilationism was clearly the rational course in America and Western Europe, this route could not easily be followed in Eastern Europe, where the ghetto walls still held. In Eastern Europe, therefore, the Jews turned toward various movements for preservation of the Jewish ethnic and cultural identity. Most prevalent was Bundism, the viewpoint of the Jewish Bund, which advocated Jewish national self-determination, up to and including a Jewish State in the predominantly Jewish areas of Eastern Europe. (Thus, according to Bundism, the city of Vilna, in Eastern Europe, with a majority population of Jews, would be part of a newly-formed Jewish State.) Another, less powerful, group of Jews, the Territorialist Movement, despairing of the future of Jews in Eastern Europe, advocated preserving the Yiddishist Jewish identity by forming Jewish colonies and communities (not States) in various unpopulated, virgin areas of the world.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Given the conditions of European Jewry in the late 19th and turn of the 20th centuries, all of these movements had a rational groundwork. The one Jewish movement that made no sense was Zionism, a movement which began blended with Jewish Territorialism. But while the Territorialists simply wanted to preserve Jewish-Yiddishist identity in a newly-developed land of their own, Zionism began to insist on a Jewish land in Palestine alone. The fact that Palestine was not a virgin land, but already occupied by an Arab peasantry, meant nothing to the ideologues of Zionism. Furthermore, the Zionists, far from hoping to preserve ghetto Yiddish culture, wished to bury it and to substitute a new culture and a new language based on an artificial secular expansion of ancient religious Hebrew.

In 1903, the British offered territory in Uganda for Jewish colonization, and the rejection of this offer by the Zionists polarized the Zionist and Territorialist movements which previously had been fused together. From then on, the Zionists would be committed to the blood-and-soil mystique of Palestine, and Palestine alone, while the Territorialists would seek virgin land elsewhere in the world.

Because of the Arabs resident in Palestine, Zionism had to become in practice an ideology of conquest. After World War I, Great Britain seized control of Palestine and used its sovereign power to promote, encourage, and abet the expropriation of Arab lands for Zionist use and for Zionist immigration. Often old Turkish land titles would be dredged up and purchased cheaply, thus expropriating the Arab peasantry on behalf of European Zionist immigration. Into the heart of the peasant and nomadic Arab world of the Middle East there thus came as colonists, and on the backs and on the bayonets of British imperialism, a largely European colonizing people.

While Zionism was now committed to Palestine as a Jewish National Home, it was not yet committed to the aggrandizement of an independent Jewish State in Palestine. Indeed, only a minority of Zionists favored a Jewish State, and many of these had broken off from official Zionism, under the influence of Vladimir Jabotinsky, to form the Zionist-Revisionist movement to agitate for a Jewish State to rule historic ancient Palestine on both sides of the Jordan River. It is not surprising that Jabotinsky expressed

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

great admiration for the militarism and the social philosophy of Mussolini's fascism.

At the other wing of Zionism were the cultural Zionists, who opposed the idea of a political Jewish State. In particular, the Ihud (Unity) movement, centered around Martin Buber and a group of distinguished Jewish intellectuals from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, advocated, when the British should leave, a bi-national Jewish-Arab state in Palestine, with neither religious group to dominate the other, but both to work in peace and harmony to build the land of Palestine.

But the inner logic of Zionism was not to be brooked. In the tumultuous World Zionist convention at New York's Hotel Biltmore in 1942, Zionism, for the first time, adopted the goal of a Jewish State in Palestine, and nothing less. The extremists had won out. From then on, there was to be permanent crisis in the Middle East.

Pressured from opposite sides by Zionists anxious for a Jewish state and by Arabs seeking an independent Palestine, the British finally decided to pull out after World War II, and to turn the problem over to the United Nations. As the drive for a Jewish State intensified, the revered Dr. Judah Magnes, President of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and head of the Ihud movement, bitterly denounced "Zionist Totalitarianism", which, he charged, is trying to bring "the entire Jewish people under its influence by force and violence. I have not yet seen the Zionist terrorists called by their rightful names: Killers--brutalized men and women . . . All Jews in America share in the guilt, even those not in accord with the activities of this new pagan leadership, but who sit at ease with folded hands . . . " Shortly afterward, Dr. Magnes felt it necessary to exile himself from Palestine and emigrate to the United States.

Under unbelievably intense pressure from the United States, the UN--including an enthusiastic US and USSR--reluctantly approved a Palestine partition plan in November 1947, a plan that formed the basis of the British pull-out and the Israel declaration of existence on May 15 of the following year. The partition plan granted the Jews, who had a negligible fraction of Palestine land, almost half the land area of the country. Zionism had succeeded in carving out a European Jewish State, over Arab territory in the Middle East. But this is by no means all. The UN agreement had provided (a) that Jerusalem be internationalized under UN

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rule, and (b) that there be an economic union between the new Jewish and Arab Palestine states. These were the basic conditions under which the UN approved partition. Both were promptly and brusquely disregarded by Israel--thus launching an escalating series of aggressions against the Arabs of the Middle East.

While the British were still in Palestine, the Zionist paramilitary forces began to crush the Palestinian Arab armed forces in a series of civil war clashes. But, more fatefully, on April 9, 1948, the fanatical Zionist-Revisionist terrorists grouped in the organization Irgun Zvai Leumi massacred a hundred women and children in the Arab village of Dein Yassin. By the advent of Israel's independence on May 15, the Palestinian Arabs, demoralized, were fleeing in panic from their homes and from the threat of massacre. The neighboring Arab states then sent in their troops. Historians are wont to describe the ensuing war as an invasion of Israel by the Arab states, heroically rebuffed by Israel, but since all of the fighting took place on Arab territory, this interpretation is clearly incorrect. What happened, in fact, is that Israel managed to seize large chunks of territory assigned to the Palestinian Arabs by the partition agreement: including the Arab areas of Western Galilee, Arab west-central Palestine as "corridor" to Jerusalem, and the Arab cities of Jaffa and Beersheba. The bulk of Jerusalem--the New City--was also seized by Israel and the UN internationalization plan discarded. The Arab armies were hampered by their own inefficiency and disunity and by a series of UN-imposed truces broken only long enough for Israel to occupy more Arab territory.

By the time of the permanent armistice agreement of February 24, 1949, then, 600,000 Jews had created a State which had originally housed 850,000 Arabs (out of a total Palestinian Arab population of 1.2 million). Of these Arabs, three-quarters of a million had been driven out from their lands and homes, and the remaining remnant was subject to a harsh military rule which, two decades later, is still in force. The homes, lands, and bank accounts of the fleeing Arab refugees were promptly confiscated by Israel and handed over to Jewish immigrants. Israel has long claimed that the three-quarters of a million Arabs were not driven out by force but rather by their own unjustified panic induced by Arab leaders--but the key point is that everyone recognizes Israel's adamant refusal to let these refugees

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

return and reclaim the property taken from them. From that day to this, for two decades, these hapless Arab refugees, their ranks now swollen by natural increase to 1.3 million, have continued to live in utter destitution in refugee camps around the Israeli borders, barely kept alive by meagre UN funds and CARE packages, living only for the day when they will return to their rightful homes.

In the areas of Palestine originally assigned to the Arabs, no Palestinian Arab government remained. The acknowledged leader of the Palestinian Arabs, their Grand Mufti Haj Amin el-Husseini, was summarily deposed by the long-time British tool, King Abdullah of Trans-jordan, who simply confiscated the Arab regions of east-central Palestine, as well as the Old City of Jerusalem. (King Abdullah's Arab Legion had been built, armed, staffed, and even headed by such colonialist British officers as Glubb Pasha.)

On the Arab refugees, Israel takes the attitude that the taxpayers of the world (i.e., largely the taxpayers of the United States) should kick in to finance a vast scheme to re-settle the Palestinian refugees somewhere in the Middle East--i.e., somewhere far from Israel. The refugees, however, understandably have no interest in being re-settled; they want their own homes and properties back, period.

The armistice agreement of 1949 was supposed to be policed by a series of Mixed Armistice Commissions, composed of Israel and her Arab neighbors. Very soon, however, Israel dissolved the Mixed Armistice Commissions and began to encroach upon more and more Arab territory. Thus, the officially demilitarized zone of El Auja was summarily seized by Israel.

Since the Middle East was still technically in a state of war (there was an armistice but no treaty of peace), Egypt, from 1949 on, continued to block the Strait of Tiran--the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba--to all Israeli shipping and to all trade with Israel. In view of the importance of the blocking of the Gulf of Aqaba in the 1967 war, it is important to remember that nobody griped at this Egyptian action: nobody said that Egypt was violating international law by closing this "peaceful international waterway." (Making any waterway open to all nations, according to international law, requires two conditions: (a) consent by all the powers abutting on the waterway, and (b) no state of war existing between any powers on the waterway. Neither of these conditions obtained for the Gulf of Aqaba: Egypt has never consented to such an agree-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment, and Israel has been in a state of war with Egypt since 1949, so that Egypt blocked the Gulf to Israeli shipping unchallenged from 1949 on.)

Israel's history of continuing aggression had only begun. Seven years later, in 1956, Israel, conjoined to British and French imperialist armies, jointly invaded Egypt. And oh how proudly Israel consciously imitated Nazi blitzkrieg and sneak-attack tactics! And oh how ironic that the very same American Establishment that had for years denounced Nazi blitzkriegs and sneak-attacks, was suddenly lost in admiration for the very same tactics employed by Israel! But in this case, the United States, momentarily abandoning its intense and continued devotion to the Israeli cause, joined with Russia in forcing the combined aggressors back from Egyptian soil. But Israel did not agree to pull its forces out of the Sinai peninsula until Egypt agreed to allow a special UN Emergency Force to administer the Sharm-el Sheikh fortress commanding the Strait of Tiran. Characteristically, Israel scornfully refused the UNEF permission to patrol its side of the border. Only Egypt agreed to allow access to the UN forces, and it was because of this that the Gulf of Aqaba was opened to Israeli shipping from 1956 on.

The 1967 crisis emerged from the fact that, over the last few years, the Palestinian Arab refugees have begun to shift from their previous bleak and passive despair, and begun to form guerrilla movements which have infiltrated the Israeli borders to carry their fight into the region of their lost homes. Since last year, Syria has been under the control of the most militantly anti-imperialist government that the Middle East has seen in years. Syria's encouragement to the Palestinian guerrilla forces led Israel's frenetic leaders to threaten war upon Syria and the conquest of Damascus--threats punctuated by severe reprisal raids against Syrian and Jordanian villages. At this point, Egypt's premier, Gamal Abdel Nasser, who had been an anti-Israel blowhard for years, but had concentrated instead on demagogic statist measures that wrecked Egypt's domestic economy, was challenged by the Syrians to do something concrete to help: in particular, to end UNEF control--and hence continuing Israeli shipping--in the Gulf of Aqaba. Hence, Nasser's request for the UNEF to leave. Pro-Israeli griping at U Thant's swift compliance is grotesque, when we consider that the UN forces were there only at Egyptian request, and that Israel has always adamantly refused to have the UN forces on its side of the border. It was at that point, with the closing of the Strait of Tiran, that Israel evidently began to set the stage for its next blitzkrieg war.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

While giving lip-service to peaceful negotiation, the Israeli government finally knuckled under to "hawk" pressure within the country; and the appointment of the notoriously war-mongering General Moshe Dayan as Minister of Defense was obviously the signal for the Israeli blitz attack that came a few days later. The incredibly swift Israeli victories; the press glorification of Israeli tactics and strategy; the patent unreadiness of the Arab forces despite the hoopla; all this indicates to all but the most naive the fact that Israel launched the war of 1967--a fact that Israel scarcely bothers to deny.

One of the most repellent aspects of the 1967 slaughter is the outspoken admiration for the Israeli conquest by almost all Americans, Jew and non-Jew alike. There seems to be a sickness deep in the American soul that causes it to identify with aggression and mass murder--the swifter and more brutal the better. In all the spate of admiration for the Israeli march, how many people were there to mourn the thousands of innocent Arab civilians murdered by the Israeli use of napalm? As for Jewish chauvinism among so-called "anti-war" people on the Left, there is no more sickening demonstration of a total lack of humanity than that displayed by Margot Hentoff in the left-liberal Village Voice:

> Is there any war you DO like? If so, are you Jewish? Lucky. What a time to be Jewish! Have you ever known any Jewish pacificists? Did you know any last week? . . . Besides, this was a different war--an old kind of war, a kind of war in which death was life-giving and Arab deaths didn't count. What a pleasure to be, once again, in favor of a war. What a good clean wholesome feeling to cheer those jeeps careening across the television screen filled with tough, lean, hard-faced, gun-bearing, JEWISH soldiers.
>
> "Look at them go! WOW! ZAP! Nothing's gonna stop them now!" said an old time radical pacifist, "This is an army of Jews!"
>
> Another (whose major contribution to Judaism until now has been to write articles disowning Israel and announcing that Judaism is dead and deserves to be) spent the week confusing his nationality. "How are we doing?" he kept asking. "How far have we gotten now?"[1]

What a "clean wholesome feeling" indeed when "Arab

1. Margot Hentoff, "Tomorrow, the World", The Village Voice (June 15, 1967), p. 9.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

deaths don't count!" Is there any difference at all between this kind of attitude and that of the Nazi persecutors of the Jews whom our press has been attacking, day in and day out, for well over twenty years?

When this war began, the Israeli leaders proclaimed that they were not interested in "one inch" of territory; their fighting was purely defensive. But now that Israel sits upon its conquests, after repeated violations of UN cease-fires, it sings a very different tune. Its forces still occupy all of the Sinai peninsula; all of Palestinian Jordan has been seized, sending another nearly 200,000 hapless Arab refugees to join their hundreds of thousands of forlorn comrades; it has seized a goodly chunk of Syria; and Israel arrogantly proclaims that it will never, never return the Old City of Jerusalem or internationalize it; Israeli seizure of all of Jerusalem is simply "not negotiable."

If Israel has been the aggressor in the Middle East, the role of the United States in all this has been even more unlovely. The hypocrisy of the U. S. position is almost unbelievable--or would be if we were not familiar with U. S. foreign policy over the decades. When the war first began, and it looked for a moment as if Israel were in danger, the U. S. rushed in to avow its dedication to the "territorial integrity of the Middle East"--as if the borders of 1949-67 were somehow embalmed in Holy Writ and had to be preserved at all costs. But--as soon as it was clear that Israel had won and conquered once again, America swiftly shed its supposed cherished "principles." Now there is no more talk of the "territorial integrity of the Middle East"; now it is all "realism" and the absurdity of going back to obsolete status quo borders and the necessity for the Arabs to accept a general settlement in the Middle East, etc. How much more evidence do we need that an approving United States has always stayed in the wings, ready to come to the aid of Israel if necessary? How much more evidence do we need that Israel is now the ally and satellite of the U. S., which in the Middle East as in so many other areas of the world has assumed the mantle once worn by British imperialism?

The one thing that Americans must not be lured into believing is that Israel is a "little" "underdog" against its mighty Arab neighbors. Israel is a European nation with a European technological standard battling a primitive and undeveloped foe; furthermore, Israel has behind it, feeding it, and financing it, the massed might of countless Americans and West Europeans, as well as the Leviathan governments

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the United States and its numerous allies and client states. Israel is no more a "gallant underdog" because of numerical inferiority than British Imperialism was a "gallant underdog" when it conquered far more populous lands in India, Africa, and Asia.

And so, Israel now sits, occupying its swollen territory, pulverizing houses and villages containing snipers, outlawing strikes of Arabs, killing Arab youths in the name of checking terrorism. But this very occupation, this very elephantiasis of Israel, provides the Arabs with a powerful long-range opportunity. In the first place, as the militant anti-imperialist regimes of Syria and Algeria now see, the Arabs can shift their strategic emphasis from hopeless conventional war with a far better armed foe to a protracted mass people's guerrilla war. Armed with light weapons, the Arab people could carry out another "Vietnam", another "Algeria" --another people's guerrilla war against a heavily armed occupying army. Of course, this is a long-run threat only, because to carry it out the Arabs would have to overthrow all of their stagnant reactionary monarchies and form a united pan-Arab nation--for the splits into nation-States in the Arab world are the consequence of the artificial machinations and depredations of British and French imperialism. But for the long-run, the threat is very real.

Israel, therefore, faces a long-run dilemma which she must someday meet. Either to continue on her present course, and, after years of mutual hostility and conflict be overthrown by Arab people's guerrilla war. Or--to change direction drastically, to cut herself loose completely from Western imperial ties, and become simply Jewish citizens of the Middle East. If she did that, then peace and harmony and justice would at last reign in that tortured region. There is ample precedent for this peaceful coexistence. For in the centuries before 19th and 20th century Western imperialism, Jew and Arab had always lived well and peacefully together in the Middle East. There is no inherent enmity or conflict between Arab and Jew. In the great centuries of Arab civilization in North Africa and Spain, Jews took a happy and prominent part--in contrast to their ongoing persecution by the fanatics of the Christian West. Shorn of Western influence and Western imperialism, that harmony can reign once more.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Democracy And The Formation Of Foreign Policy:

The Case Of F.D.R. And America's Entrance Into World War II

*By Ronald Radosh**

F. D. R.'s Undeclared War, 1939 to 1941, by T. R. Fehrenbach. David McKay Company, Inc., New York, 1967, $6.50

Discussion about the methods used by Franklin D. Roosevelt to bring the United States into World War II is not new. The dominant group of American historians have defended Roosevelt's actions as those forced upon the President by the course of Axis aggression. A smaller group of revisionist historians have argued that American policy makers follwed a path that pushed the United States towards active involvement in what might have remained a purely European war.

The concentration on the revisionist charge that American policy contributed as much or even more than the Axis policy towards causing a new world war obscured a more fundamental charge levied by the revisionists--that while

* Ronald Radosh is Assistant Professor of History at Queensborough Community College of the City University of New York. He is the co-editor (with Louis Menashe) of Teach-Ins U. S. A., Reports, Opinions, Documents (Praeger, 1967)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

President Roosevelt publicly pledged to avoid involvement in the war, he deceptively took steps that made overt belligerency a matter of time. In the words of then Congresswoman Clare Booth Luce, Roosevelt was "lying the country into war." If the President had felt that his public antiwar commitments of 1940 had been rendered obsolete by events in 1941, as Charles A. Beard so ably expressed it, he had "constitutional and moral obligations to explain to the country the grounds and nature of a reversal in policy." Such an explanation was never presented. What Beard had raised was the question of the character of a national leadership which showed so little confidence in its citizens that it preferred to lie about the issue of war and peace. Such realization of the dishonesty of Executive rhetoric meant the need to question the substance of a democracy whose leaders left no choice for the public but acquiescence in the prior decisions of the Executive branch.

T. R. Fehrenbach is the most recent to re-evaluate F. D. R.'s method of taking the nation into war. Fehrenbach's book is not distinguished by the relating of any new or original material. Much of the work, indeed, is condensation and popular presentation of the writings of Charles A. Beard, William Henry Chamberlin, Harry Elmer Barnes, William Neumann, as well as the recent scholarly account of the same period provided by Robert A. Divine. One of the inexcusable omissions is any form of bibliography or footnotes. The result is that the uninitiated reader remains unaware of Fehrenbach's sources and the books of previous authors whose work Fehrenbach has obviously studied closely and drawn from freely.

Nevertheless, Fehrenbach deserves comment because of the unusual twist he brings to the material. Fehrenbach concentrates on the effect that F. D. R.'s policy had on the democratic ethos. Previously the majority of Roosevelt's defenders have argued that while the President may have actually deceived the people, he was acting, as Thomas A. Bailey once wrote, like "the physician who must tell the patient lies for the patient's own good." Certainly this meant that the President had not entrusted the people with the truth. But as Bailey argued, the masses are "notoriously shortsighted" and must be deceived into awareness of their own long term interests. Or, as F. D. R.'s key aide Harry Hopkins had put it, "the people are too goddam dumb to understand." Put simply, this is the old thesis that the truth must be kept from the people

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

approach permits enactment of a foreign policy otherwise opposed (and possibly prevented from enactment) by the populace, it also assures a permanent damage to the moral fibre of a democratic nation.

Among the group of Roosevelt's supporters, Fehrenbach distinguishes himself by acceptance of the validity of the major charges levied by the revisionists. He concisely, cogently, and persuasively reveals that the Roosevelt Administration took a series of major steps consciously intended to lead the country into a posture of belligerency against the Axis powers. Publicly, such steps were masqueraded as policies that would keep the peace and maintain American neutrality.

One example cited is the exchange of American destroyers for British bases in the Caribbean and Newfoundland in September 1940. Fehrenbach does not mask the fact that this act violated neutrality statutes, was not covered by "cash and carry" legislation, and would not have been approved by the electorate. But Roosevelt avoided Congress in order to secure quick action, "avoid damaging debate, which might further divide the nation," and thereby assure that the deal went through. Fehrenbach also understands the implication of the move for democracy. "If the President acted," he writes, "the Congress and the public, presented with an accomplished fact, had no means of counteracting him. They could approve or disapprove - but they could not set the act aside." The problem is that in a democracy, substantive public debate must take place before acts are committed if it is to have genuine meaning as well as the chance of affecting policy.

Of all the secret measures taken by the Roosevelt Administration in 1941, none was more significant than the conferences with the British staff held between January and March. These led to agreement that the U. S. Navy would convoy all transatlantic shipping, a step that violated the Neutrality Act. What made this agreement particularly reprehensible was that if the populace had known, it would undoubtedly have repudiated the President. Rather than announce and publicly state why he felt such acts were necessary, F. D. R. "publicly took the position that he was against convoys because they meant shooting." These commitments could only have the final result of leading the United States into war. When Roosevelt ordered naval forces into the declared Nazi war zone beyond Greenland, it was inevitable that a clash would occur.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In his discussion of Japanese - American relations prior to Pearl Harbor, Fehrenbach makes it clear that resistance to Japanese aggression was not what motivated American leadership. Rather, it was the confrontation of the growing Japanese commercial empire in Asia with the West. Japan was seeking commercial expansion and prestige just as the Western powers, and in the process they had developed a "dynamic militarism" that worried the West.

Those Americans who were not willing to fight in defense of the West's empire (or desired empire) in Asia are derided. Herbert Hoover is accurately discussed as one who took the position "that the United States could not, and had no business in trying, to act as a policeman halfway across the world." Yet the intimation is that those in agreement were somehow wrong, although Fehrenbach himself admits that the war's conclusion saw Japan granted exactly what she desired before Pearl Harbor; namely the "opening up of the European colonial preserves in Asia, and also the American market to Japanese manufactures." A major reason for American opposition to Japan, he suggests, was the stake in Vietnam, then French Indo-China. Noting that American officials had become aware of its strategic importance, Fehrenbach writes that its possession by Japan was viewed as posing a "genuine threat to the Western position in Malay and the Indies." For what was at stake was the need to keep Japan out of the rich and productive areas in the Dutch East Indies. When the Japanese finally decided to stage their infamous attack at Pearl Harbor, its purpose "was defensive." The attack was not meant to lead Japan into war with the United States. It was designed only to prevent feared American interference in a declared or undeclared war against Japanese activity in the Indies.

Fehrenbach has only disrespect for those Americans who exercised their right of dissent and opposed the direction of American policy. Isolationists are ridiculed for their ignorance of the threat posed by the Nazis, and for endorsing Charles Lindbergh's belief that "if we enter fighting for democracy abroad we may end by losing it at home." While by 1941 it was possibly too late to avoid war, Fehrenbach's excellent discussion of American-Soviet diplomacy suggests that had the constant Soviet proposals for a common front against the Nazis before 1939 been accepted, it "might have completely stopped German aggression before it scored its early, vital successes."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But if the Western leaders had been blinded by their anti-Communism into failing to forge such a common front, hoping instead that Hitler and Stalin would fight each other alone; then the isolationist argument that war did not have to occur, and that its consequences might be negative within the United States, makes more sense than if opposition to "Atlantic escalation" is taken out of context. When he discusses Lindbergh, Fehrenbach makes the attack on "isolationism" meaningful to contemporary readers by the explanation that Lindbergh was "no more responsible for his actions" than are Bettina Aptheker and Staughton Lynd, who Fehrenbach argues have "inherited a mental outlook as well as genes."

The last comment presents the reader with an insight into Fehrenbach's real thesis. His argument essentially is that the secret measures taken by F. D. R. and the increased power in the hands of the Executive were necessary to assure American security; that in fact the American defense perimeter lies anywhere on the globe where the President sees American power and interests being challenged. What upsets Fehrenbach is not the decay of the democratic process begun by the Roosevelt Administration, but that F. D. R.'s tactics made it appear that his "serious war moves" seemed casually taken, though in reality they were carefully planned.

Fehrenbach believes that rather than withdraw to defend only U. S. national territory, or even extend defense to the Western hemisphere, defense of United States interests (which remain undefined by Fehrenbach) had to be wrapped in a "world view," to the "earliest point of engagement - even if this were ten thousand miles away." Fehrenbach's criticism of Roosevelt is that he was not a Winston Churchhill--that he tried to develop a consensus behind a firm defense policy before openly taking necessary measures. He should have acted as a leader who brought the country to understand the need for increase of the security perimeter.

The result of F. D. R.'s actions was that the United States had actually entered a limited war against the Axis, solely through Executive action. By December 7, 1941 the United States already had a developed arms program, and had planned and coordinated future war strategy. By 1940, in fact, it had violated neutrality statutes by giving official Government aid to Great Britain, a belligerent power. These were, Fehrenbach notes, "enormous precedents." But Fehrenbach has merely shown what they

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were, and has avoided asking the hard but necessary questions. He sees that the role of the Presidency was expanded, "without sharply defined limits to the powers of this office." This meant that the President could use his powers "to commit American power abroad," and that Congress would be unable to halt a strong President who used Executive authority for such a commitment.

But all of this is offered as proof that Congress cannot "be effective in the fields of foreign policy," and Fehrenbach suggests that international power politics requires changes in the government structure which F. D. R. freely inaugurated. Whether they were constitutional or not. or resulted in war, is beside the point, because to Fehrenbach war itself is "neither moral nor immoral." One of th problems facing any President is that in a democracy "the idea of foreign war still was met with prejudice." The public did not hold to a concept of "advanced defense" and clung to "territoriality, rejecting 'foreign' war." Hence many who supported F. D. R.'s undeclared war did so for the wrong reasons. They supported Roosevelt because they hated Hitler, rather than because they accepted "the concept of world power" and new strategic relationships. The result is what Fehrenbach terms a "new, liberal isolationism," since liberals acted as "long-term isolationists" who, once Hitler was buried, sought again to retreat.

Fehrenbach's message, it seems, is that those who really understood the need to fight in Europe and Asia in the 1940's should be consistent and support the present effort in Vietnam. Roosevelt in the '40's wanted to avoid at all costs a President's war, and to gain national unity for belligerency. Hence he saw a need to prepare for war while pretending to be for peace. Fehrenbach is critical because Roosevelt allowed a peace bloc to form around some Senators, which created an atmosphere in favor of neutrality. Fehrenbach feels that F. D. R. was hesitant in taking a belligerent stance because he paid too much attention to his "isolationist" critics. Instead, he should have squarely faced the fact that opposition "could in no way have halted or prevented any Presidential act–if the act were strongly pushed." Unlike other F. D. R. supporters, Fehrenbach sees no need for Roosevelt having acted secretly when public approval did not exist for implementation of a new policy. Here he departs from the apologetics of historians like Bailey. But his criticism is a tactical one. Roosevelt should have performed like Churchill and forged a new public opinion that was more sound. He ends by suggesting that "a truly great President and American would have no

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

concern for what might happen to him personally once he had committed the nation to an irrevocable course, anymore than a soldier charging up a hill," perhaps the most novel compliment to and rationale ever presented for Lyndon Johnson's policies in Vietnam.

In one sense, Fehrenbach is correct. The precedents established by F. D. R. before World War II have borne fruit in Johnson's policy in Vietnam, particularly in regard to the method of escalation. Fehrenbach's problem, however, is that his material does not lead to endorsement of his thesis. Rather, the material suggests that opponents of our contemporary arrogance of power must pause and reevaluate their analysis of Roosevelt's method of confrontation with the Axis powers. No better way to start exists than to re-read and learn from the monumental and misunderstood work by the late Charles A. Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941.

Beard succeeded in confronting the real issues; an area in which Fehrenbach most notably fails. He understood that one major difference between democracy and totalitarian government is that the Constitution unequivocally does not "vest in the Congress or the President illimitable power secretly to determine the ends of the government in foreign or domestic affairs and secretly to choose and employ any means deemed desirable by either branch of the government to achieve those ends."

If the precedents established by Roosevelt were allowed to stand, Beard had prophesied, it would mean that a future President might during an election campaign "publicly promise the people to keep the country out of war and, after victory at the polls, may set out secretly on a course designed or practically certain to bring war upon the country." Finally, Beard warned, the President might, as a "crowning act in the arrogation of authority to himself, without the consent of the Senate, make a commitment to the head of a foreign government which binds the United States to 'police the world,' . . . to dominate the world, and the American people are thereby in honor bound to provide the military, naval and economic forces necessary to pursue, with no assurance of success, this exacting business."

Beard's darkest fears have, unfortunately, already occurred. Just as in 1941 the passage of Lend-Lease was used by interventionists to argue that the Act authorized the President to do anything he deemed necessary to mili-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tarily defeat Germany, even launching overt war, (an assumption totally unwarranted from the terms, conditions and arguments used for passage of Lend-Lease aid); so today the Gulf of Tonkin resolution is interpreted by the President and contemporary interventionists as a blank check for the conduct of large scale warfare in Asia, in which American troops were to conduct the bulk of the fighting.

Ironically, reexamination of the old revisionist writings on World War II leads to important new insights. In past years the revisionist thesis, most often equated with conservative thought and politics, was rejected by liberals and "radicals" who glorified and vaunted the powers of the President, especially in foreign affairs, and who sneered at the obstructionism of Congress. Now, when the nation faces a President whom the liberals almost uniformly revile, they yearn for a Congress that would be more responsive to their wishes in blocking his adventurist foreign policy. Yet the powers enjoyed by Lyndon B. Johnson, who fights an undeclared war without Congressional consent, and who escalates constantly while proclaiming a policy of peace, is a continuation of the policy and powers initiated by Franklin D. Roosevelt. For these reasons, many liberals today see that the old "conservative" critics were not so wide of the mark; that the much vaunted liberal ideal of "collective security" implied the increasingly naked reality of an informal Empire over the rest of the world; and that the praises sung to "internationalism" acutally meant espousal of interventionism, and that the denigration of "isolationism" meant concerted attack upon the few principled opponents of American expansion. By implication, these points may be discovered by a reading of Fehrenbach's book. Perhaps, despite its author's intentions, it will help a new generation come closer to the attainment of peace.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Power Elite Revisited

By Laurence S. Moss*

The revolutionary spirit of C. Wright Mills remains to be recaptured. From his major living disciple, Irving Horowitz, [1] we have received a prolific collection of articles and papers that attempt to clarify the ideas and sources upon which Mills' analysis of American society was based. But nowhere in the academic tones of Horowitz, or in the countless array of Millsian-inspired articles, do we encounter that same unique power to "set things straight", that rare ability to expose and educate, that characterize Mills' work. The starting point for the libertarian thinker must be the Power Elite.[2] This study, which commands the attention all scholarly research deserves, overcomes

---

* Laurence S. Moss is a graduate student in the department of economics, Columbia University. He holds the M. A. in economics from Queens College of the City University of New York, and is the author of "Adam Smith--Social Scientist," Social Science Review (April, 1966).

1. Irving Louis Horowitz's contributions have appeared in the form of introductions to books by Mills and about Mills. See The New Sociology, Horowitz ed. (Oxford University Press, 1964), and Power Politics and People, (Ballantine, 1962). Horowitz has written several books all of which display the great influence of Mills; witness the title of his 1963 work, The War Game: Studies of the New Civilian Militarists. Of especial interest is Horowitz's "Commentary" on The Power Elite entitled C. Wright Mills' The Power Elite published by Study Master (New York, 1966).

2. C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, (Oxford University Press, 1959).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the contemporary preoccupation with trivia by tackling a subject that transcends the locale of a Middletown, or the inconsequential machinations of some street-gang in Chicago -- the maintenance and practice of "power" in American society. For it was self-evident to Mills, as it is obvious to us, that the perpetuation of the American monolith with its de facto ability to declare war, to bomb cities, and to interfere with the struggles of other peoples, stands as the foremost threat to the whole of American civilization--perhaps, human civilization.

The course of history over the past twelve years (since the first edition of the Power Elite appeared) has served to corroborate Mills' diagnosis. The fears and concerns that Mills expressed in the 'fifties are the fears and concerns that we have inherited in the 'sixties. With increasing alarm we find that the political decisions affecting our destinies have been snatched out of the hands of the mass of American citizens and into the tailored pockets of a small group of "policy makers". No matter what the imprecision Mills faced when defining the "power elite" and delimiting it from the rest of the populace, one fact remains clear; the common man is "represented" by a small group of policy makers, while the same common man, stilled by his impotence and beguiled by public school myths, is made to bear responsibility for decisions that he has not made (and probably would never have made, if given the choice). The "power elite" is real precisely because the country is divided up into the privileged who make the major decisions and the pillaged who work all of their lives to butter the others' bread.

Thus, the purpose of the Power Elite was to answer the important questions, "who in American politics are making the crucial decisions?" and "what types of human beings are these decision-makers?" Mills' classified his work as "sociology", though his analysis of the problem served to throw light on another question asked by political scientists; "What types of decisions are being made?" The implications of the Power Elite are indeed profound.

Mills found that the members of the "power elite" are recruited from three primary sources of power--the military establishment, the modern corporation, and the state itself. This existing elite is characterized by the fact that those Americans seeking to gain access to the upper circles of the power pyramid must be privileged. They must possess wealth, ivy-league educations, proper social affiliations and above all a certain kind of saleable

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

personality. These requirements can be fulfilled by only a few; and it is only a few who ever become the kings in the American game of political chess. Mills found no Horatio Algers in modern American politics because the "power elite" has ascended to a position where it can regenerate itself! Not through purity of the blood, as it was for the Pharaoh; not through noble patronage, as it was in pre-revolutionary France; but by patronizing institutions that are geared to mold a certain type of human being who they themselves deem fit to rule. Attendance at select schools, membership in the "correct" social clubs, belief in the Protestant ethos, all act to create the type of specimens the elite will sort out from the rest of the populace to inherit their reign. Whether it be the President of the United States, or the selection of a military advisor, the individuals are recruited from only one pot -- a pot that contains only one blend of soup.

Whatever the differences between the policy makers' personalities, habits, and interests; Mills argued that they cease to matter when it comes to the exercise of political power. The implication of his analysis is as subtle as it is poignant; if the decision-makers are all of one type then the decisions that they reach will also be of one kind. Clearly not the kind that the ordinary man is likely to make. It is extremely doubtful that the bombing of Hiroshima or the war in Viet Nam would have succeeded if put to a general referendum. Where is the representative democracy we learned about in high school? No where else but in the books!

A more important observation (one that Mills neglected to make) is that if the taxpayer were free to refuse his taxes, if the soldier were free to decide what to do with his life, where would the vital resources for these monstrous efforts come? How long could the elite survive with stale bread? - Or, even more likely, no bread at all?

As an analysis of the distribution of power in American society, the Power Elite made no attempt to suggest a viable alternative to the corporate-state capitalism we experience today. Mills' work was dedicated to an analysis of the problem of power, rather than to a plan for political reconstruction. We might conjecture as to what type of social arrangement Mills preferred. There is some evidence to suggest that Mills favored a competitive market economy coupled with a limited and decentralized Federal govern-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment.[3] But Mills did not advocate this program because he believed that such an arrangement of affairs was no longer "technologically" possible.[4] Such an ideal belonged to an earlier age.

His study of American history convinced him that the passing of the laissez-faire economy dated from the mid-nineteenth century when technological development of large-scale production necessitated the break-up of the small competitive entrepreneurship and christened the evolution of the modern corporation.[5] It was the economic power of the corporation that, according to Mills, added the third source of power to that of the military and the state. This coalition between the "corporate chieftains", the "warlords" and the "political directorate" marked the transition of a once basically individualistic economy to one ruled by the "power elite".

We might only add that Mills' pessimism might have been unwarranted. Mills' despair was based upon a popular but erroneous interpretation of American history.[6] In the first place, Mills errs in assuming that there was once a time in history when "representative democracy" actually operated and the individual directed national policy. The inception of the American Constitution and the formation of the Federal government were the offspring of individuals hardly representative of the rest of the nation.[7] At no time did "We the people . . ." describe the sentiments of the people

---

3. See The Power Elite, p. 260, and Robert B. Notestein, "The Moral Commitment of C. Wright Mills" in The New Sociology, pp. 49-53.

4. The Power Elite, pp. 259-60.

5. Ibid.

6. One source of this "popular" history of American society is E. H. Carr, The New Society, (Beacon Press, 1951).

7. A complete documentation of this position remains to be published. I have consulted the finished manuscript of Murray N. Rothbard on the period of colonial America where the author attempts to analyze the famous Constitutional Convention in terms of what actually happened rather than in terms of what many historians wanted to have happened. The manuscript is to be the first volume of a complete history of the United States. The still curious reader may consult with profit a small pamphlet by the libertarian-lawyer, Lysander Spooner, in which he argues that the American Constitution is "illegal". The argument

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

living in 1786.[8] Furthermore, the history of the Federal government is a history not of balancing one pressure group against another, but a history of creating the very pressure groups that served to augment the state's mighty power. Thus a correct study of American history must assign the state a causative role in creating the other sources of power from which it nourishes.

A study of business legislation in the United States leads one to wonder how quickly laissez-faire would have died, in the absence of the spider web of tariff protection and subsidy privilege granted to business by the ever-expanding state. One modern historian[9] has made such a study and holds the belief that most of the so-called "anti-trust" regulation did more to perpetuate the growth of the powerful corporation than to "reestablish" competition. Thus it was not so much the necessitites of large-scale production that created the features of "corporate-capitalism" and made the corporation chieftains immune to ordinary market pressures, but the active support of the state itself. The marriage Mills describes between the state and the economy is real, but the evidence seems to indicate that the state has wedded its own son.

Furthermore, Mills has failed to prove that the market economy is impractical in our modern age. The Power Elite does not expalin why economic power must necessarily become political power. In fact, Mills equates the two as synonymous while we must distinguish between these two types of power so that their differences remain. It is true that corporations can certainly grow large in size in the absence of state assistance. But economic power in a

---

is based on the idea that unlike ordinary contracts between living individuals, the Constitution was signed by some individuals and meant to be binding on all future generations of individuals -- thus, in what sense is the Constitution a "contract"? This is, of course, the immediate objection to Hobbes' "contract theory" of the state. It is necessary to mention that Spooner constructs several other objections to the legitimacy of the Constitution. See his No Treason No II The Constitution, 1867 (Boston).

8. No Treason, p. 5 and see also Beard's analysis of the backgrounds of the constitutional delegates, Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, (Macmillan, 1962).

9. See Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism, (Free Press, 1963).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

market economy is acquired and maintained in ways alien to that of state and military power. The power to sell is only as strong as another's willingness to buy; and when the consumers stop buying, the life of the mightiest corporation is dated by the time it takes for its assets to be liquidated. On the other hand, when the consumer stops "buying" the "services" of the state, he is jailed, humiliated, and ultimately murdered. The maintenance of political power involves the language of taxation, the language of conscription--the language of violence. Tongues all foreign to the market economy.

There is still another reason to relinquish the Millsian pessimism of the 'fifties--something that Mills did not live long enough to see. While today there still remains that awesome cleavage between the rulers and the ruled; the ruled are not as unaware of it as they were when the Power Elite was written. On college campuses and within certain minority movements, one individual after another is beginning to see through the opaque curtain of American politics. In the eyes of the New Left (a student movement influenced by Mills' work) and in some of the rhetoric of the "Negro revolution", the "power elite" is being exposed and held up to its proper ridicule.[10] Whether these voices crying in the wilderness will be able to challenge effectively the American monolith remains to be seen. "Times are changing. . ." but not fast enough. The Johnsons will be reelected for many years to come as the Republican and Democratic parties monopolize the presidential privilege. For the present, the libertarian must become better equipped for the future, for if he some day succeeds in winning back the individual's freedom, it will be because part of his armour was fashioned by Mills' powerful Power Elite.

---

10. See Left and Right, Vol. III, No. 1., Winter 1967, editorial entitled, "SDS: The New Turn" and also, Rothbard's "The Negro Revolution" in New Individualist Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Summer 1963) published at the University of Chicago.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A VIETNAM BIBLIOGRAPHY

By Marvin E. Gettleman,

With The Assistance Of

*Sanford L. Silverman**

1. AGGRESSION from the North: The Record of North Vietnam's Campaign to Conquer South Vietnam. (U. S. Department of State Publication 7839: Far Eastern Series 130.) (Washington, D. C., Februrary, 1965). The "White Paper" of 1965, presenting the case for "escalation." (Reprinted in no. 32 below).

2. AMERICAN FRIENDS of Vietnam. A Symposium on America's Stake in Vietnam. (New York, September, 1956). Contains, among other things, Hans Morgenthau's useful assessment of the Geneva conference (pp. 64-70) and Senator John F. Kennedy on "America's Stake in Vietnam" (pp. 8-14). (See the discussion of the American Friends of Vietnam in no. 85 below).

---

* Compiled and annotated October 19, 1967 by Marvin E. Gettleman, Assistant Professor of History, Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn, with the assistance of Sanford L. Silverman, Liberal Arts Bibliographer, The Libraries, Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn. An earlier version of this bibliography, prepared by Gettleman and Silverman in July 1967, was published in STACKS, July, 1967, a publication of The Libraries of the Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

3. AMERICAN FRIENDS Service Committee. Peace in Vietnam: A New Approach in Southeast Asia. (New York: Hill & Wang, 1966). A Quaker-sponsored inquiry, prepared by a group that included several Asia specialists. Carefully presented alternative policies are discussed.

4. APTHEKER, Herbert. Mission to Hanoi. (New York: International Publishers, 1966). Record of a trip taken by a Moscow-oriented U. S. communist theoretician. Compare no. 61 below.

5. BACKGROUND Information Relating to South-east Asia and Vietnam. (Revised, June 16, 1965, Report of the U. S. Senate Committe on Foreign Relations, 89th Congress: 1st Session) (Washington, D. C., 1965). This collection documents the American goverment's position.

6. BATOR, Victor. Vietnam: A Diplomatic Tragedy. (Dobbs Ferry, N. Y.: Oceana Publications, 1965). Study of international diplomacy in Southeast Asia.

7. BINH Thanh (see Hai Thu, jt. auth., no. 40 below).

8. BOUSCAREN, Anthony Trawick. The Last of the Mandarins: Diem of Vietnam. (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 1965). An adulatory biography of Ngo Dinh Diem. A serious charge of plagiarism was laid against this book in The American Political Science Review, LIX (December, 1964), pp. 1013-4.

9. BROMLEY, Dorothy Dunbar. Washington and Vietnam: An examination of the Moral and Politcal Issues. (Dobbs Ferry, N. Y.: Oceana Publications, 1966). A study, written primarily for clergymen, stressing ethical considerations in government policy.

10. BROWNE, Robert S. "The Freedom Movement and the War in Vietnam", Freedomways, V (Fall, 1965), pp. 467-480. Suggestive parallels between liberation movements in the black communities of America, and the liberation struggle in Vietnam.

11. BURCHETT, Wilfred. North of the Seventeenth Parallel. (Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1956); Mekong Upstream. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959); The Furtive War: The United States in Vietnam and Laos. (New York: International Pub-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lishers, 1963); Vietnam: Inside Story of the Guerilla War. (New York: International Publishers, 1965); Vietnam North. (New York: International Publishers, 1966). Rich record of the observations of an able Australian journalist sympathetic to the Communist cause in Indochina.

12. BURLING, Robbins. Hill Farms and Padi Fields: Life in Mainland Southeast Asia. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965). An anthropological study, dealing with the ethnology and political geography of the region.

13. BUTTINGER, Joseph. The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958). Takes the story to 1900, and offers a bibliography and a chronology to 1956. The author tends to be discursive, and his interpretation is characterized by an adulation of Ngo Dinh Diem. Buttinger, his views modified, has taken the history of Vietnam through 1963 in Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled. 2 vols. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967).

14. CADY, John F. Southeast Asia: Its Historical Development. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964). Broadly conceived study by the author of the prize-winning Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia. (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954).

15. CAMERON, James. Here is Your Enemy. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966). An English newspaperman's eyewitness account of the North Vietnamese response to the U. S. escalations in 1965.

16. CARVER, George A. Jr. "The Real Revolution in South Vietnam," Foreign Affairs, XLIII (April, 1965), pp. 387-408. A skillful, but debatable thesis that there is a genuinely revolutionary force in South Vietnam outside of the National Liberation Front. By the time Carver's sequel appeared, ("The Faceless Viet Cong," Foreign Affairs, XLIV, April, 1966, pp. 347-372), stating the U. S. government's position on the NLF, it became known that the author had been a CIA agent.

17. CHINH, Truong. Primer for Revolt (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963). Facsimile reproduction of English translations of two important works (The August Revolution and The Resistance Will Win) by a leading North Vietnamese theorist.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

18. CHOMSKY, Noam. "The Responsibility of Intellectuals," The New York Review of Books, VIII (February 23, 1967). A brilliant and powerful critique of the attempt by administration intellectuals to defend U. S. Vietnam policy. Chomsky believes "It is the responsibility of intellectuals to speak the truth and to expose lies."

19. CLUBB, Oliver Edmund Jr. The United States and the Sino-Soviet Bloc in Southeast Asia. (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1962). Critical analysis of international relations from a liberal perspective.

20. COEDES, G. The Making of South East Asia. tr., by H. M. Wright (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967). An anthropological study of the people of Indochina.

21. COLE, Allan B., et al. (eds.). Conflict in Indochina and International Repercussions: A Documentary History 1945-1955. (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, for the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts University, 1956). A documentary approach to the Indochinese conflict which is a model of scholarship.

22. COLLINS, J. and others. Medical Problems of South Vietnam, 1966. (Boston, Mass., Physicians for Social Responsibility, 1966). A detailed overview of all aspects of illness, civilian casualties and health facilities in South Vietnam through the end of 1966.

23. DEVILLERS, Philippe. Histoire du Vietnam de 1940 a 1952. 3d ed. (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1952). The basic book on the genesis of the first Indochinese war. The author's "Struggle for Unification of Vietnam" (China Quarterly, no. 9, January - March, 1962, pp. 2-23) is the best account of the origin of the guerrilla war in South Vietnam (reprinted no. 32 below).

24. DODD, Senator Thomas J. (ed). The Anti-Vietnam Agitation and the Teach-In Movement, Staff Report of the U. S. Senate, Judiciary Committee. (89th Congress: 1st session) (Washington, D. C.; U. S. Government Printing Office, October, 1965). The aim is to demonstrate that the teach-in movement is communist-controlled. (Compare no. 66 below).

25. DRAPER, Theodore. Abuse of Power (New York: Viking, 1967). A well argued, tactical indictment of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

U. S. foreign policy in Vietnam and elsewhere. Draper's "How Not to Negotiate", The New York Review of Books, VIII (May 4, 1967), presents the thesis that the U. S. government has, in fact, avoided negotiations in Vietnam.

26. DuBERRIER, Hilaire. Background to Betrayal: the Tragedy of Vietnam. (Boston: Western Islands, 1965). Analysis by the Indochina correspondent of American Opinion of Vietnamese developments from the Geneva conference until the American escalation in 1965. Useful for information on the rise and maintenance of power of Diem, and the role of the CIA and the State Department. Important contribution on the persecution of the religious sects and their role in forming the National Liberation Front.

27. DuBOFF, Richard B. (see Herman, Edward S., jt. auth. no. 45 below).

28. DUNCAN, Donald. The New Legions (New York: Random House, 1967). An inside story of the Green Berets in Vietnam. See no. 70 below.

29. FALL, Bernard B. Late author of a huge corpus of uneven writings on Vietnam and Indochina. Of most value are The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis (Revised ed., New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1964). Vietnam Witness, 1953-1966 (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1966) is a collection of Fall's essays and articles. Hell In a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu (New York, Lippincott, 1967) is a detailed account of the events of the spring of 1954, less readable than selection no. 80 below.

30. FIFIELD, Russell H. The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia, 1945-1958. (New York: Harper, 1958). Chapter 8 deals with the international diplomacy surrounding Vietnam.

31. FULBRIGHT, Senator William J. (ed). The Vietnam Hearings. (New York, Vintage Books, 1966). A condensation of Supplemental Foreign Assistance/ Fiscal Year, 1966 -- Vietnam, Hearings, before the U. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, January-February 1966 (89th Congress; 2d session). (Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1966). Fulbright's Arrogance of Power (New York, Vintage

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books, 1967) is an eloquent critique of U. S. Foreign Policy.

32. GETTLEMAN, Marvin E. Vietnam: History, Documents and Opinions. (New York, Fawcett World Library, 1965; 2d ed., Harmondsworth, England, Penguin books, 1966). A basic selection of readings drawn from many of the books and articles listed in this bibliography, as well as such key documents as the Geneva Agreements of 1954, The Reports of the International Control Commission, official government statements, National Liberation Front statements, teach-in texts, etc.

33. GETTLEMAN, Marvin E. and MERMELSTEIN, David. The Great Society Reader: The Failure of American Liberalism. (New York: Vintage Books, 1967). A comprehensive survey of American society and politics, based upon the conviction of the unity between foreign and domestic policy.

34. GIAP, Vo Nguyen. People's War, People's Army (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965). Facsimile publication of English translations of the political and military papers of the great North Vietnamese general, and strategist of the victory at Dienbienphu.

35. GIGON, Fernand. Les Americains face au Vietcong (Paris: Flammarion, 1965). Well-informed account of this fateful confrontation by an able Swiss journalist.

36. GOODWIN, Richard. Triumph or Tragedy: Reflections on Vietnam (New York: Vintage Books, 1966). An exercise in political Weltschmerz, with the barely disguised aim of providing the Kennedy government-in-exile with a foreign policy image different from the tarnished one of LBJ. (See no. 88 below).

37. GREENE, Felix. Vietnam! Vietnam! (Palo Alto, Calif.: Fulton Publishing Co., 1966). A brief, accurate text, with extensive quotations; its strongest point is its powerful and moving photographs.

38. GURTOV, Melvin. The First Vietnam Crisis: Chinese Communist Strategy and United States Involvement, 1953-1954 (Studies in the East Asian Institute, Columbia University) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967). A run-of-the-mill piece of RAND Corporation

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

geo-political mysticism. See the review by Marvin E. Gettleman in The Progressive (Madison, Wisc.) XXXI: 8 (August, 1967), pp. 39-41.

39. HAHN, Thich Nhat. Vietnam: Lotus in a Sea of Fire. (New York: Hill & Wang, 1967). Eloquent statement of a Buddhist position of neutralism in the Vietnamese conflict.

40. HAI Thu and BINH Thanh. Coup After Coup in Saigon. (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1964). A North Vietnamese view of the sometimes amusing, sometimes brutal, political instability in the South.

41. HALBERSTAM, David. The Making of a Quagmire. (New York: Random House, 1964). An exciting and revealing account from the perspective of a young American journalist, whose reporting from Vietnam won a Pulitzer Prize in 1964.

42. HALL, D. G. E. A History of South-East Asia. 2d ed. (London: Macmillan, 1964). From prehistory to today's independent states, this work presents a synthesis of the area's complex history.

43. HAMMER, Ellen J. The Struggle for Indochina. (Institute of Pacific Relations). (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1954). A superb study of the French effort to hold on to Indochina.

44. HAYDEN, Thomas (see LYND, Staughton, jt. auth., no. 61 below).

45. HERMAN, Edward S. and DuBOFF, Richard B. America's Vietnam Policy: The Strategy of Deception. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1966). A powerful indictment. An early, abbreviated version of this study was entitled: "How to Coo Like a Dove While Fighting to Win."

46. HICKEY, Gerald Cannon. Village in Vietnam. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964). Anthropological study of a South Vietnam village, innocent of any political understanding.

47. HIGGINS, Marguerite. Our Vietnam Nightmare. (New York: Harper & Row, 1965). The late newspaper woman argues that Diem was the kind of man we should support "out there." His assassination, which she

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

blames on the U. S., was in her eyes a great abiding blunder.

48. HO Chi Minh (Pseud.). Selected Works. 4 vols. (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960-1962). A collection drawn from Nguyen Tat Thanh's (or Nguyen Ai Quoc's) long lifetime of revolutionary activity. Bernard Fall's collection, On Revolution: Selected Writings of Ho, 1920-1966, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), although it contains recent material, is no substitute for the Hanoi collection. Against U. S. Aggression: For National Salvation (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1967) is an official collection of Ho's recent speeches and pronouncements.

49. INTERNATIONAL Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, Reports (London: Great Britain Parliamentary Sessional Papers, 1954-1967). Essential documents from the body set up to police the Geneva Agreements. (Brief excerpts appear in no. 32, above).

50. KAHIN, George McT., (ed). Government and Politics of Southeast Asia. (Cornell Southeast Asia Program). 2d ed. (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1964). A magnificent reference work, the first book to consult on Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos, Cambodia, the Phillipines, and even Vietnam. Good bibliographies.

51. KAHIN, George McTurnan and LEWIS, John W. The United States in Vietnam (New York: Delta Books, 1967). The fullest and best informed liberal critique of the U. S. position. Good maps, useful documentary appendices and bibliographies.

52. LACOUTURE, Jean. Vietnam Between Two Truces. (New York: Vintage Books, 1966). Well informed, historically grounded (if over-optimistic) analysis by an experienced French journalist.

53. LANCASTER, Donald. The Emancipation of French Indo-China. (Royal Institute of International Affairs). (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961). The best single book on the history of all Indochina to about 1955. (Selection printed in no. 32 above).

54. LANDSBERG, Brian K. "The United States in Vietnam: A case Study in the Law of Intervention," California Law Review, (August, 1962) pp. 515-531. A sophisticated

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

defense of U. S. policy, based upon the assumption of South Vietnamese sovereignty.

55. LAWYERS Committee on American Policy Towards Vietnam. Vietnam and International Law: An Analysis of the Legality of the U. S. Military Involvement (Flanders, N. J.: O'Hare Books, 1967). A comprehensive examination by a distinguished group of international lawyers. Also an "answer" to the official U. S. position, as expressed in Leonard C. Meeker, "The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Vietnam," U. S. Department of State Bulletin (March 28, 1966).

56. LE THANH KHO. Le Vietnam, Histoire et Civilization: Le Milieu et l'histoire. (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1955). Historical survey of Vietnam by a Vietnamese writer sympathetic to the Communist cause.

57. LEWIS, John W. (see KAHIN, George M., jt. auth., no. 51 above).

58. LIBERMAN, Robert. Medical and Social Consequences of the War in Vietnam (April, 1967). A short pamphlet which documents the concerns raised by 7000 health professionals in their petition to President Johnson.

59. LOWENFELS, Walter. Where is Vietnam? (New York: Doubleday, 1967). Poems on the horrors of war, mostly motivated by Vietnam, by some of America's finest poets.

60. LU, Shih-p'eng. Vietnam During the Period of Chinese Rule (IIId Century B. C. to Xth Century A. D.) - A History of Sino-Vietnamese Relations, Vol. I, Monograph Series no. 3), Southeast Asia Studies Section, . . . Chinese University of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, 1964). The first of a series of documentary volumes, in Chinese; this one deals with the annexation of Vietnam by China in 111 B. C.

61. LYND, Staughton and HAYDEN, Thomas. The Other Side (New York: New American Library, 1967). This account by Herbert Aptheker's "fellow travellers" (see no. 4 above) illustrates the "New Left's" basic posture on international affairs.

62. McCARTHY, Joseph E. Illusion of Power: American

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Policy Toward Vietnam, 1954-1966 (New York: Carleton Press, 1967). An argument that U. S. support of such figures as Diem is necessary lest Chinese-backed wars of national liberation spread in the third world.

63. McCARTHY, Mary. Reports from Vietnam (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967). Adding to the eye-witness reports, which appeared in the New York Review of Books, April-May 1967, in perceptive on-the-spot observations of an eminent American novelist, new material on anti-war tactics in the U. S.

64. McDERMOTT, John. "The History of Vietnam", in three parts, plus a bibliography, Viet-Report, I (June-November, 1965). A useful condensation of the history of the war-torn nation based largely upon secondary sources. This author's "Welfare Imperialism in Vietnam", The Nation (July 25, 1966), suggests that the U. S. is primarily motivated by misguided idealism in Vietnam, a position from which McDermott retreats in "Vietnam is No Mistake", The Nation (February 13, 1967), reprinted in no. 33 above. Mr. McDermott is associate editor of Viet-Report (see no. 101 below).

65. McGOVERN, Senator George C. "A Proposal for Vietnam," The New York Review of Books, VI (July 7, 1966). Presents an alternative policy that the Johnson administration refuses to countenance. In a brilliant and courageous speech (Congressional Record, Senate, April 25, 1967), Senator McGovern has warned of the grave dangers involved in the present collision course.

66. MENASHE, Louis and RADOSH, Ronald. Teach-ins U. S. A.: Reports, Opinions, Documents. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967). A many-sided examination of the political, academic and social phenomenon of the teach-ins. MENASHE, Louis (ed). Berkeley Teach-In: Vietnam. An LP documentary of the Berkeley Teach-In with introductory notes on the background of the teach-in movement by the editor. (Folkways Records; 2 LP records: FD 5765). Texts of sixteen of the speeches delivered at this celebrated teach-in are also contained in We Accuse (Berkeley, Calif.: Diablo Press, 1965), introduction by James Petras; afterword by the Berkeley Vietnam Day Committee. MENASHE, Louis and WELLS, Rosalind (eds). The Original Town Hall Read-in for Peace in Vietnam, is another LP documentary including poetry readings by many authors (New York: Broadside Records, BR 452: 1967).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

67. MERMELSTEIN, David (see GETTLEMAN, Marvin, jt. auth., no. 33 above).

68. MODELSKI, George, "The Vietminh Complex," in Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton, Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses of Political Violence. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 185-214. Contains many shrewd insights into Vietminh strategy.

69. MONTAGUE, Frank D. "United States Postwar Policy Toward Indochina" (unpublished M. A. thesis in International Relations, University of Chicago, 1953). An analysis and justification of the course taken by U. S. policy makers to come to France's aid in Indochina.

70. MOORE, Robin. Green Berets (New York: Crown, 1965). A long-time bestseller, which, in the spirit of American tough-guy literature, heaps praise on the U. S. Army Special Forces. (See no. 28, above).

71. MORGENTHAU, Hans J. Vietnam and the United States (Washington D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965). A collection of essays by a consistent advocate of the primacy of "national interest" and of Realpolitik.

72. MURTI, B. S. N. Vietnam Divided: The Unfinished Struggle (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964). A useful account of the work of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam (see no. 49) by an Indian official of the Commission.

73. NEWMAN, Bernard. Background to Vietnam. (New York: Signet, 1966). A journalistic survey, uncritically accepting the official U. S. rationale for being in Vietnam.

74. NICOLAUS, Martin. "The Professors, the Policemen and the Peasants: The Sociology of the Michigan State University Group Vietnam Project, 1955-1962." (Graduate Seminar Paper, Brandeis University, 1966) is a far better study of MSU than the journalistic expose in Ramparts (April, 1966). Selections from Nicolaus' study, under the title "The Professor, The Policeman and the Peasant," appear in Viet-Report, II (Februrary-April, 1966).

75. OSBORNE, Milton E. Strategic Hamlets in South

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Vietnam: A Survey and a Comparison (Ithaca, N. Y. Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1965). A full assessment of the disastrous South Vietnam experiment, in the light of earlier programs in Malaya.

76. PIKE, Douglas. Viet Cong: Organization and Technique of the National Liberation Front (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966). Rich with the use of masses of captured NLF material, this book is a unique work of scholarship. Though Pike concludes that the NLF is controlled from Hanoi, much of his data suggests local independence.

77. RAMPARTS Magazine, "Vietnam Primer" (Menlo Park, California, Ramparts, 1966). Containing the famous "I Quit" statement by former Special Forces Sergeant Donald Duncan, and a selection of articles mainly by Robert Scheer.

78. RASKIN, Marcus G. and FALL, Bernard B. The Vietnam Reader (New York: Vintage Books, 1966). An anthology much different in focus than no. 32 above. See the joint review by Robert Wolfe in Viet-Report, II (January, 1966).

79. REPUBLICAN Policy Committee, U. S. Senate, The War in Vietnam. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1967). The famous Republican "White Paper", sharply critical of American involvement in Vietnam.

80. ROY, Jules. The Battle of Dienbienphu. Tr. by Robert Baldick. (New York: Harper and Row, 1965). A chronicle based on Roy's interviews with participants in the battle of Dienbienphu. See also Roy's eloquent "Letter to Americans" in Viet - Report, I (October, 1965), pp. 28-31.

81. RUSSELL, Bertrand. War Crimes in Vietnam. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967). A powerful and angry statement by one of the great minds of our century.

82. SAHLINS, Marshall. "The Destruction of Conscience in Vietnam," Dissent, XIII (January/ February, 1966), pp. 36-62. Making brilliant use of his skills as a professional anthropologist. Shalins studies the transformations of American soldiers at war in Vietnam.

83. SALISBURY, Harrison. Behind the Lines - Hanoi: Dec-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ember 23-January 7 (New York: Harper & Row, 1967). This distinguished New York Times writer reported that civilian targets were being bombed in North Vietnam.

84. SALMON, Malcolm. Focus on Indo-China. (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961). A comprehensive historical survey by an Australian journalist.

85. SCHEER, Robert. How the United States Got Involved in Vietnam. (Report to the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions). (Santa Barbara, California: Fund for the Republic, 1965). An analysis by a young American journalist and political activist of the role of the Catholic hierarchy, Michigan State University, The New Leader, The American Friends of Vietnam, and sundry others in molding U. S. policy towards Vietnam. Substantial portions on this study are reprinted in no. 32 above.

86. SCHESCH, Adam. "The Organizing Tactics of the Vietnamese Communist Party Before World War II" (unpublished M. A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1967). Although an immature exercise in analysis, this study contains some valuable data, especially from French sources. Schesch's An Outline History of Vietnam (Madison, Wisc., n. d.) is a useful compilation of facts and quotations.

87. SCIGLIANO, Robert. South Vietnam: A Nation Under Stress (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1963). A full and fairly objective survey, down to just before the overthrow of Diem.

88. SCHLESINGER, Arthur M., Jr. The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam and American Democracy, 1941-1966 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966). A member of the Kennedy "government in exile", this prize-winning historian enters a mild dissent from the Johnson Administration's policy.

89. SCHURMANN, Franz and others. The Politics of Escalation in Vietnam. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). Incisive analysis of ten episodes in U. S. policy toward Vietnam. Presented as a "citizen's white paper" to LBJ.

90. SHAPLEN, Robert. The Lost Revolution: the Story o

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Twenty Years of Neglected Opportunities in Vietnam and of America's Failure to Foster Democracy There. (New York: Harper and Row, 1965). A critical account which attributes U. S. policy to "indecision, stupidity or sheer laziness."

91. SNOW, Edgar. The Other Side of the River: Red China Today. (New York: Random House, 1962). Chapter 85 is a good, short survey of recent Vietnamese history. It is also published separately as a pamphlet by Marzani and Munsell, Publishers, New York City.

92. STONE, I. F. "Vietnam: An Exercise in Self-Delusion," New York Review of Books (April 22, 1965). Brilliant examination of American misunderstandings. See also no. 1 above, Stone's careful "Reply to the White Paper," I. F. Stone's Weekly, XII (March 8, 1965), reprinted in no. 32 above.

93. TABOULET, Georges. La Geste Francais en Indochina. (Paris: Adrien-Maissonnueve, 1955-1956). A two-volume collection of documents illustrating French colonialism in Indochina to 1913 (one selection printed in no. 32 above).

94. TANHAM, George K. Communist Revolutionary Warfare: The Vietminh in Indochina. (New York, Praeger, 1961). A RAND study, highly revealing of the popular and organizational bases of Vietminh success.

95. A THREAT to the Peace: North Vietnam's Effort to Conquer South Vietnam. 2 vols. U. S. Department of State Publication 7308; Far Eastern Series 110. (Washington, D. C., December 1961). The "White Paper" or "Blue Book" of 1961, indicating the Kennedy administration's deepening commitment in Vietnam. (Brief selections appear in nos. 32 and 78 above).

96. TOYNBEE, Arnold J. "The Failure of American Foreign Policy," Fact, II (September/October, 1965), pp. 3-7. A bitter excoriation of what the eminent historian calls American "aggression" in Vietnam and elsewhere.

97. TRAGER, Frank. Why Vietnam? (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966). Commissioned by the U. S. State Department for a substantial sum, this crude work of sub-scholarship approaches the falsifications committed by Stalinist historians in Russia.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

98. UNIVERSITY of New South Wales, Study group on Vietnam. Vietnam and Australia: History, Documents, Interpretations (Gladesville, N. S. W., 1966). A balanced historical survey to which is added a sharp critique of Australian commitment. Available from the Study Group, 48 Milling Street, Gladesville, N. S. W., Australia.

99. VIETNAM Lao Dong (Communist) Party. Thirty Years of Struggle of the Party. (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House. 1960). Party history, often in the rigid mold of the genre covering the period 1930 to 1945.

100. VIETNAM: Voices of Policy and Protest. An LP documentary of Vietnam debate. Excerpts from speeches by opponents of the war and by members of the Johnson and Kennedy administrations; with narration. (Rostrum Records, 153 East 57th St., NYC 10022).

101. VIET REPORT: An Emergency News-Bulletin on Southeast Asian Affairs (133 West 72d Street, N. Y. C., 10023). An important and useful publication, covering the history and present situation.

102. WEINSTEIN, Franklin B. Vietnam's Unheld Elections: The Failure to Carry Out the 1956 Reunification Elections and the Effect on Hanoi . . . (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1966). A full study of the question.

103. WHITE, Ralph K., and others. "Misperception and the Vietnam War." Journal of Social Issues XXII (July 1966). An entire issue of this journal is devoted to the exploration of the psychological factors behind U. S. involvement.

104. ZAGORIA, Donald S. "Communism in Asia," Commentary XXXIX (February, 1965), pp. 53-58. A careful investigation into the vast differences between Asian and East European Communism.

105. ZINN, Howard. Vietnam: The Logic of Withdrawal. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967). Brief, educated, angry analysis of such questions as the "Munich analogy," revolutionary and counter-revolutionary violence, and the possibility and desirability of U. S. withdrawal.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A BERNARD FALL RETROSPECTIVE

On February 21, 1967, while on patrol with U. S. Marines north of Hue, in South Vietnam, Bernard Fall, distinguished French-born expert on Vietnam and a professor at Howard University, was killed by a land-mine. Left and Right here presents reviews of Fall's last two works, recently published, on Vietnam.

Bernard B. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness 1953-66, New York, Praeger, 1966, 363 pages, $6.95.

BY LEONARD P. LIGGIO

Bernard Fall has been the principal source for the American public of detailed information and analysis of the political and social developments in South-East Asia and the United States' reaction to them. Time and again, Professor Fall has demonstrated that the facts have been the reverse of the 'official history' presented through the newspapers and magazines by the State Department and the Pentagon. Yet, despite the personal courage which this consistency has required, it is less a compliment to him than a condemnation of the academic and journalistic institutions in this country. That the United States government controls and manipulates information, using it as an instrument of the Administration's policy objectives, and seeks to defame, harass and punish those who seek out and report the actual facts, is well-known to any realistic observer. But, that the academic and journalistic institutions, and thus almost all scholars and journalists, cooperate in the objectives and methods of the government

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in foreign policy matters, remains one of the unrecognized facts of contemporary America. As Fall expresses it in his introduction to Viet-Nam Witness:

> When social-science research has reasons-of-state limitations placed upon its conclusions, it runs into heavy risks of losing its validity . . . In the case of Viet-Nam, that situation was finally pushed to a tragic extreme in which practically all specialists dealing with the country were operating under contract either with the Saigon government or with one of the American aid programs . . . University and foundation reports indicate only too clearly and too often that scholarship has in many cases become a new kind of "big business." In the long run, this may well stifle the yearning for the unexplored paths and for dissent of a higher level and greater import than a medieval theologians' debate around safely established basic verities.

Nevertheless, Fall himself established his role with greater sophistication "around safely established basic verities." He expresses the view that the role of the independent scholar or journalist is not to change the direction and objectives of the country's foreign policy but to influence, benefit, or improve the methods of achieving the direction and objectives, the "safely established basic verities," of United States foreign policy. In his Epilogue to Viet-Nam Witness, and despite the evidence he has marshalled over many years, Fall affirms the purpose of aiding the United States to achieve its ends and to work its will in South-East Asia behind the ever-present facade of anti-communism. His subtle recommendation to divide the National Liberation Front from solidarity with North Vietnam, to turn the NLF into an instrument of United States policy, forgets the ultimate fact of contemporary Vietnamese history--popular hostility to Western influence and rejection of any government which may cooperate with the United States. Unable to suffer military defeat, the role of either the NLF or North Vietnam with regard to the South Vietnamese would be totally reversed if either undertook cooperation with the United States, a policy incompatible with national popularity.

Fall's major contributions have been analyses of the military and the social-political aspects of the quarter century of conflict that has centered around the Vietnamese people; many of these analyses, drawn from the New Republic, Nation, New York Times Magazine, Foreign Affairs, Viet-Report among others, have been collected

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to form Viet-Nam Witness. The major themes of Fall's analyses are United States policy, the limits of military power in the Vietnam conflict, and the social foundations and political methods of the Vietnamese guerrillas. The theme of United States policy, real and ideal, is generally considered indirectly by Fall. Just as he projects for the future the achieving of continued "American control" in South-East Asia, and thereby in all Asia beyond China's borders, by gaining NLF cooperation with the United States, so Fall projected a similar means for a similar objective in discussing the advantages to the West of the Geneva agreement of July, 1954. In March, 1954 Fall suggested that should a demarcation line be drawn between the Vietminh strongholds of Ho Chi-minh in northern Vietnam and the southern provinces, there would be a "great opportunity" for the application of American foreign aid -- the vanguard of American political objectives since Fall speaks of "political successes almost entirely due to the intelligent dispensation of economic aid." Ho's government, according to Fall, would have had to depend upon the West, essentially the United States, given the economic weakness of the Soviet Union and China in 1954, if the Geneva conference could deprive Ho of the rice-surplus Mekong delta. "Therein lies the great opportunity for the West; massive economic aid might swing the balance." Although United States policy was being implemented by different alternatives (as Fall intimated: "it is certainly not by sheer coincidence that General Donovan, wartime OSS chief, is now Ambassador to Thailand"), it is clear that Ho's government could not have counted on its popular support had it cooperated in these United States designs. The same may be said for Fall's alternative of United States aid and influence on Ho Chi-minh in 1946 to create a center of Western policy against the Soviet Union and China; and again, despite Fall's ambivalence, post-war United States policy was evident from USA markings on the armed vehicles and bombers with which the French returned to Vietnam and from the agreement to sell the French one hundred and sixty million dollars of U. S. military equipment.

"The French, thanks to their U. S. - donated air force, had destroyed every visible target in the Communist-held areas for eight long years." Repeatedly, with reference to the French war against the Vietnamese as well as the American war, Fall emphasizes that faith in the value of air power is an illusion. "The Indochina War had confirmed once more -- the Korean conflict being, by and large, another example -- the limited usefulness of air

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

superiority in wars involving underdeveloped areas." (Italics Fall's.) "Perhaps it may be useful to stress here again the overwhelming ineffectualness of combat airpower in that type of operation (jungle warfare)." (Fall, of course, is referring to the military ineffectiveness and not to the results of such bombing upon the civilian population.) The same limitations apply to the effectiveness of other heavy weapons and to advanced delivery vehicles. In the final article in Viet-Nam Witness, dated a year ago, Fall compares the airborne operations of the French and the Americans:

> At least four offensives, with airborne and armoured "pincers," and supplemented by navy landing craft, involved more than 20,000 troops. (The largest offensive thus far undertaken by U. S. forces in Viet-Nam involved a total of 12,000 troops.) Yet in every case the enemy refused to fight except on his own terms. The French armored pincers would close on a melee of frightened peasants . . . Americans have encountered similar frustration.

For those who are impressed by the firepower and transportation superiority of the United States forces in Viet-Nam, Fall warns: "the technological differences, for all their magnitude and importance, are thus far more superficial than is often realized."

Fall's final comparison between the French war which ended at Geneva in 1954 and the present United States War concerns the State Department-Pentagon claim that the French effort was defeated by the "collapse" of public support in France. Fall answers that it was the military defeat of the French forces (for which the United States paid 80% of the costs) which caused the French public to demand an end of the war in Vietnam.

> It was not civilian morale at home that placed 16,000 troops at Dien Bien Phu and allowed them to be defeated there. Noisy students on U. S. college campuses cannot be held responsible because 96,000 South Vietnamese troops left their units at one time or another this year . . .

When the French war in Vietnam ended at Geneva in 1954 the United States was already a major participant, paying almost the entire cost of the war and already committing U. S. Air Force units to the effort. Bernard Fall has been the major source for information on the early United States involvement in domestic Vietnamese politics

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

beginning with the end of the Second World War. Much of this was involvement in the hands of the OSS (of which the CIA is the successor). In The Two Viet-Nams (New York: Praeger, 1963) Fall notes that there was a belief in 1946 that the United States was preparing the former emperor Bao Dai, who remained as an adviser to President Ho Chi-minh, as an alternative to Ho; when Bao-Dai abandoned his office in Ho's government for exile in Hong Kong in March, 1946 he left Hanoi on a United States military plane. A year later, after the French had decided to overthrow Ho's elected government, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and had driven it from its capital, Hanoi, into the jungle, Bao-Dai was asked by Ho to act as mediator. Bao-Dai rejected this on the advice of "Dr. Phan Quang Dan, American-trained and an OSS operative during World War II." (Dr. Dan, after two decades of involvement in Vietnamese politics and residence in the United States, was currently a vice-presidential candidate in the newest of many attempts to create a "constitutional" government as rival to the popularity of Ho Chi-minh and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.)

Later in 1947 Bao-Dai agreed to the French offer that he become the "constitutional" chief of state of an "independent" Vietnam regime supported by the French army and the American Treasury, following discussions in Hong Kong with former Ambassador William C. Bullitt. Through United States foreign aid, especially the Marshall Plan, France was able to offset the costs of the war in Vietnam. The United States advanced formal recognition to the Saigon regime of Bao-Dai in February, 1950 to repay the French, who had joined the United States in January, 1950 in vetoing the U. N. membership of the People's Republic of China. China responded within a month by recognizing Ho Chi-minh's Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. American economic and military aid for the Saigon regime was announced in May, 1950 and as it became dominant in the war so did the United States' political influence. The most significant aspect of Fall's account of the municipal and provincial elections of 1953, held under restricted suffrage in safe districts, is the role of the United States. In Hanoi, where the United States Information Service supported a Vietnamese newspaper, American sympathizers were elected over the official candidates. When the United States arranged the appointment of Diem as Premier of the Saigon regime in 1954, United States control became complete.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Fall's Viet-Nam Witness analyzes the situation in Vietnam at the time that Diem came to power in 1954-55, during the Diem regime, and in the most recent period. The Geneva Agreement of 1954 provided for a temporary line to permit the evacuation of foreign (French) forces -- "the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be considered as constituting a political or territorial boundary" -- and for general elections to be held in July, 1956. At that time Fall felt that the Diem regime had several advantages for building itself into a successful rival for national leadership with Ho Chi-minh's Democratic Republic of Vietnam. South Vietnam, little damaged by war, and enriched by the refugees from the North and American aid, was the rice-surplus region. Furthermore, the Geneva Agreement gave Diem's regime larger population and territory than the Saigon regime had controlled before the Agreement and gave it a better chance of governing by the completed withdrawal of Vietminh guerrillas to the north under the Agreement. "In other words," Fall concluded, "with an even moderately intelligent policy, southern Viet-Nam should be able to turn the tables on the Viet-Minh and carry out the promises which the Viet-Minh has made during the past seven years, and will find difficult to fulfill in the now greatly impoverished and war-ragged North." Fall was disappointed with the early policy of Diem, especially his failure to exercise the power of the central government in the localities, which merely continued the methods of the past administrations. Soon, Diem did make a complete break with the past by turning upon and destroying the political and military power of the armed Buddhist sects: Cao Dai, Hoa-Hao and Binh Xuyen. Southern Vietnam was little damaged by war because very early after the return of the French these three armed politico-religious sects of the Mekong region, which had been allied against the French with Ho's Vietminh, entered into a benevolent neutrality with the French. The sects had turned against the Vietminh, whose leadership in southern Vietnam had attempted to fight both the French and the sects. The autonomous political and military power which the sects exercised in the regions inhabited by their adherents made them both "a solid barrier against Viet-Minh infiltration" and "an element of instability" in a Westernized, bureaucratic state. The destruction of the political and military power of the sects by Diem in the spring of 1955, however, merely transformed the struggle to the swamps, jungles, and rice fields of the Mekong Delta where the sects' adherents lived. "The armed remnants of the sects are still able to carry on extensive harassing operations," Fall said in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

July, 1955," . . . but it is unlikely that they will ever regain even part of their erstwhile political strength." Yet, the sects had "3,000 or more officers" whose political and military training formed a reservoir of leadership should full-scale popular opposition develop against the Saigon regime.

Previous to the Geneva Agreement Fall had written of the importance of the traditional autonomy of the Vietnamese peasants' village; although under Ho Chi-minh's leadership the old village notables were replaced by the "armed adolescents" who had joined the Vietminh,

> the very fact that village autonomy was so deeply rooted made an ideal breeding ground for the type of local administration found in the early postrevolutionary years in the Soviet Union. Indeed, the decentralizing policy practiced by the revolutionary government presented great analogies with that applied by the Communist government of Soviet Russia.

Following upon the defeat of the sect armies the Diem regime struck at this village autonomy; according to Fall, "South Viet-Nam had been converted into a full-fledged dictatorship at the village level -- where it is most keenly felt in that kind of society -- as early as 1956, when Diem abolished elected village government." Besides the maintenance of feudal taxes and the failure to introduce land reform, a series of presidential decrees threatened large numbers of people in the Vietnamese villages: January, 1956, indefinite detention in concentration camps; June, 1956, abolition of the elected village councils (both of these were preliminary to Diem's refusal to hold reunification elections as provided by the Geneva Agreement); and March, 1957, reprisals against "former resistance members" (former Vietminh guerrillas) contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Agreement. Thus, "faced with physical extermination along with the sect units, some of the former Viet-Minh guerrillas simply banded together for survival." In 1958 the U. S. Ambassador to Vietnam declared that "the Communists and sect remnants have regrouped" in the Mekong Delta. At that time Fall described the resurgence of guerrilla activity:

> Guerrilla activities in South Viet-Nam during 1957 and 1958 no longer represent a last-ditch fight of dispersed sect or Communist rebel remnants. On the contrary, they have taken on a pattern of their own which is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quite different from that followed by the Viet-Minh during the struggle against the French.

This unique pattern of operations and organization culminated in the formation of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam on December 20, 1960. With understandable pride Bernard Fall notes that he was the first person to establish "the fact of the resurgence of revolutionary war in South Viet-Nam in 1957." With such credentials Fall is well-qualified to determine the real origins of the National Liberation Front. In 1965 he stated:

> It is, therefore, highly immaterial to attempt to trace back Communist intentions at subverting South Viet-Nam to a particular meeting of the North Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee in May, 1959, or to a particular resolution of the same party's Third National Congress, held in Hanoi in September, 1960. Long before those dates the Second Indochina War had assumed its basic pattern . . .

On his return from a visit to Hanoi in 1962 Fall noted the absence of any popular support for the Saigon regime: "Without that support, American helicopters and modern weapons cannot do very much." At the same time, on the basis of statements by administration spokesmen such as Walt W. Rostow, Fall concluded that "the present trend is to go so far as to say that popular support is not particularly relevant to the outcome of a guerrilla war." This attitude explains the United States military's carelessness about civilians in Vietnam, as well as the conscious implementation of a policy of genocide against the Vietnamese people. Fall's expert conclusion that popular support is vital and that modern military power is inadequate does not reduce or eliminate the responsiblity of Americans for confronting the destruction of the Vietnamese people sanctioned in their name.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POSTSCRIPT:

FIRST THOUGHTS ON THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE DEATH OF BERNARD FALL

Like many who came to politcal consciousness during the second world war, Bernard Fall possessed a sixth sense about political issues. But, in the case of Fall this sense was enriched by his seizing upon an active political role -- as a young guerrilla in the French Forces of the Interior. The French resistance produced a diverse group of post-war tendencies: careerists who entered government posts or the bureaucracy and parliamentary seats of the so-called Left in France, as well as some who maintained their principled independence. However, the latter phrased their opposition in terms of a politics of regret or disappointment -- misunderstanding the resistance to be a totally independent movement. The premises of such politics have been that the government has good intentions and is free to change its direction once the truth is presented to it. This has meant a search for dialogue with the 'Left' in the Surete and Foreign Legion, or in the CIA, State Department and Marines -- a dialogue with the officials who use revolutionary literature to give political meaning to their torturing, regroupment, napalming and extermination of the civilian population in the guerrilla conflicts with the Vietminh, the FLN in Algeria and the National Liberation Front of So. Vietnam.

The illusions of the resistance, especially the army as a revolutionary force, explain Fall's close ties to the military -- French and American. This tie brought him to the main world battle front -- Vietnam -- in 1953; and in the following year he wrote incisively about the significance of the Geneva Agreements. From that time he became the major, almost the sole, independent commentator in American periodicals about Vietnam. Yet, his view of such an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

independent role was not to question the assumptions which were the foundation of the policies he analyzed.

Bernard Fall visited the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on several occasions; an unusual event for a scholar in America. His work on the DRV is according to the highest standards of contemporary professional political science: it is mechanical and his least valuable contribution. In South Vietnam, despite his anti-Communist and original pro-Diemist bias, or because of it, he was the earliest to realize that there was a renewal of popular insurgency. It was more with horror than hope that he described the evidence of the widespread popular support for the NLF. His negative or ambivalent attitude toward the NLF reflected his lack of comprehension of them. Familiar with Hanoi and Saigon, he never visited the liberated zones of South Vietnam, his information on the NLF (as his information on the Vietminh) came from printed materials, not observation and contact with the NLF leadership or rank-and-file. Do the requirements of professional academic standards -- travel grants from Nato, Seato or Asia Foundation, government-paid visiting professorships abroad, lectureships at the War College and the University strategy institutes -- preclude visiting and reporting about the single most important element in the Vietnam situation -- the popular insurgents?

Fall knew that the contemporary historian must confront contemporary events directly. But, he was drawn to confront contemporary events alongside the Foreign Legion and Marines, and not alongside the guerrillas. Although expressed in this manner, the crucial point is that Fall did have the courage to meet events directly, "to dare all, and then see." As a military historian, Fall would appreicate the analogy to the slogan of the wars of the French Revolution that in a revolutionary period every soldier carries a marshal's baton in his knapsack; the American public has awarded him a symbolic baton for the highest public service: independent criticism of government policy. Will his courageous confrontation with reality be an isolated event, or will scholars in America assume the tasks accepted by Fall and continue them in their logical direction whatever the consequences -- "to dare all, and then see"?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Frenchman's Viewpoint

Bernard B. Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu ("Great Battles of History," Hanson W. Baldwin, General Editor) (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1966). pp. 515 + xii $8.95.

By Marvin E. Gettleman*

What does Bernard Fall mean when he tells us that "Only General Vo Nguyen Giap, in Hanoi, is truly qualified" to narrate the siege of Dien Bien Phu? Is it that since history is written mainly by the victors, the Chief of Staff of the People's Army of Vietnam is the appropriate chronicler of the 1954 victory of his forces in that fateful valley near the Laotian border? Does Fall imply that he himself will try to write the book that Giap never managed to do? He falls short of this aim, in this narrowly conceived, poorly written (yet exhaustively researched) study of the battle of Dien Bien Phu. (The account by Jules Roy, published in English in 1965, is far superior.)

No doubt it is this book we will turn to if we need to find out what French battalions and companies occupied just which of the strongpoints in the valley, or what sorts of girls were available for the French troops at the two mobile field bordellos at Dien Bien Phu. Fall has had access

---

* Marvin E. Gettleman is Assistant Professor of History at the Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn. He is the author of Vietnam: History, Documents and Opinions (New York: Fawcett, 1965), and co-author (with David Mermelstein) of The Great Society Reader: The Failure of American Liberalism (New York: Random House, 1967).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to documentation in Paris that no other scholar has used. Armed with this data, he demolishes such myths as the belief that Foreign Legion regiments were exclusively manned by Germans (though the "3/3" battalion was so composed). He also reveals hitherto unexplored facets of French strategy leading up to the battle. But while we are given ample explanation of the French defeat, we get little insight into what certainly was a Vietnamese victory. And that victory is what Giap would have written about, and indeed has written about in Dien Bien Phu (3d ed., Hanoi, 1964), which Fall dismisses as an inconsequential pamphlet.

Fall's approach to the military history of Vietnam in 1954 is narrowly confined to the French viewpoint. The "communists", as troops of the People's Army of Vietnam are consistently called, invariably lay down "murderous barrages," attack "like hungry wolves," and fire "ferocious" artillery shells. The trenches of General Giap's forces are "communist trenches," their bullets are "communist bullets," roads under their control are "communist roads," etc. The adjective "Vietnamese" is reserved for the locally recruited troops fighting more or less half-heartedly on the French side. Contemporary usage in 1954 was different, and possibly more accurate. The French had no special word for their Vietnamese allies, but the enemy was universally called the "Viets." These Viet forces of General Giap called their countrymen who fought against them by the not unapt name, "puppets." Fall's departure from the terminology of 1954 brings no greater clarity to the events he narrates.

His pro-French bias is not only revealed in his choice of adjectives; it pervades the substance of his interpretations as well. When things go badly for the French garrison (almost every page!) the situations are described as "grim" and "tragic." French troops are credited with heroic feats; the Viets, never. Their bravery is pictured as fanaticism. Whereas too often historical works slight the losing side, here we have a book in which the winners are shadowy and obscure, their victory ultimately unexplained. Instead, Fall waveringly offers us a series of pseudo-explanations of the final denouement in early May. First we are told that the basic mistake was to garrison the valley in the first place without providing sufficient reserve forces. Again, using purely military reasoning, Fall ascribes the French defeat to inadequate artillery, and to failures in combat engineering. Yet other, more profound analyses constantly threaten to show through the dense fog of Fall's military prose. At one point he

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

concedes that there was something more to the war than military or strategic considerations. In another place Fall deplores the fact that the local population into whose midst a French garrison was introduced in late 1953 had not been prepared beforehand by proper political indoctrination. But here's the rub! Under what ideological guise could the French have masqueraded as anything but the reconquerers of their Indochinese empire?

It is ultimately his failure to come to grips with these political realities of the First Indochinese War that makes it difficult to apply Fall's insights to the current struggle in Vietnam, the Second Indochinese War. He is full of useful suggestions on how the French might have won the battle -- more efficient application of firepower, better methods of provisioning a garrison in every territory, and fuller use of aircraft. Fall candidly states that " . . . similar situations are likely to recur in other wars of this type." The promoters of such wars will do well to study Fall's book.

As for the rest of us, we may well ponder the words of a French paratroop commander at Dien Bien Phu, which Fall reports without comment. Col. Marcel Bigeard told Fall, ten years after the battle, "If you had given me 10,000 SS troops we'd have held out." The implication is that it will be necessary in the Indochinese wars of the present and future to send Storm Troopers of some sort into the fields against the insurgents. But what kind of a society produces Storm Troopers? What kind of movement generates a force that only Storm Troopers can supress? Bernard Fall makes no attempt to answer these questions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED